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ARTICLES
THE SONG OF DEATH: THE LYRICS OF
EUTHANASIA
Margaret A. Somerville*
This text began its existence as one of a series of lectures on medical deci-
sions at the end of life.' In preparing and delivering these lectures, two com-
mon, but powerful and important, insights were strongly reinforced. First,
our debate about euthanasia concerns much more than that matter, itself, for
both individuals and society; and, second, the role of language is immensely
important in forming the issues in this debate and responses to those issues.
This is true, because consideration of euthanasia requires both thinking and
feeling, and language forms and affects how we both think and feel, and
whether these functions are integrated or separated.
In order to explore some of the complex dilemmas and interactions that
confront us in dealing with euthanasia, we need to examine the way in which
language is used in this context, including in, but not limited to, the law.
Language is used in describing and formulating the issues raised by euthana-
sia, in handling these, and in eliciting responses to the approaches taken.
* Director, McGill Centre for Medicine, Ethics and Law, Quebec, Canada. This text is
dedicated to Knut Hammarskj6ld and Michael Kirby, whose friendship with each other and
me, has been of great importance in my life.
I am indebted to Sharifa Janmohamed for a great deal of assistance and exceptional paience
and tolerance in preparing this text.
1. Brendan F. Brown Lecture, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.,
November 1990. Other lectures included, "Reasonably Well or Dead: Squaring the Curve",
the Walter Zuckerman Memorial Lecture on Medical Ethics, Mount Auburn Hospital, Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, November 1990; "The Polemics of Euthanasia", speech delivered at the
Joint Assembly of the Catholic Health Association of Canada and the United States, Montreal,
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the Seventh International Hospice Institute Symposium, "Management of Terminal Illness:
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- The Euthanasia Debate", speech delivered at the XV Conference on the Law of the World,
World Jurist Association, Barcelona, Spain, October 1991; and "Legalizing Euthanasia:
Which Way The Tide?", speech delivered at the 9th International Congress on Care of the
Terminally Ill, presented by Palliative Care Medicine, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec,
November 1992; "Euthanasia: The Death(ly) Debate", Lowther Lecture, York University,
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This examination also needs to include exploration of how language is used
to label or characterize situations in order to deal with these situations in
certain, pre-determined ways. Moreover, we also need to recognize that lan-
guage is relevant both to "talking about" euthanasia and to "doing" (carry-
ing out) euthanasia.2 Perhaps, the most striking recent example of this is the
book, Final Exit 1. This book "talks" about euthanasia in order to advocate
euthanasia, but it, also, can be directly involved in "doing" euthanasia, for
example, in those cases where people have been found dead with the book
beside them, open at the pages containing the detailed instructions which
they have followed to kill themselves.
I. DEFINITION
No where is the use of language more important and, sometimes, more
confused and confusing, than when it is employed for the purposes of defini-
tion. This is especially true with respect to the definition of euthanasia.
Even when one has an over-riding aim of neutrality and precision, it is diffi-
cult to define, accurately and clearly, which interventions or non-interven-
tions should and which should not be regarded as constituting euthanasia.
Such a definition is, however, essential and the range of possibilities with
respect to it, are explored in this section.
The etymological origins of the word euthanasia - "good death" - are to-
day common knowledge, as a result of the publicity that has surrounded the
topic. The use of this terminology, quite apart from its definitional content
(that is, what does and does not constitute euthanasia), merits consideration.
For everyone, at some level, death is "bad" in the sense of sad and unhappy,
but some ways of dying are "less bad" and "less unhappy" than other ways
and these are "good deaths". We all hope, and hope to be assisted, to be in
the latter category with respect to our own deaths. The issue on which we
disagree, is what should be the limits, if any, placed on such assistance.
It is interesting that both the pro-choice (pro-euthanasia) advocates and
some segments of the pro-life (anti-euthanasia) movement have argued for a
wide definition of the term euthanasia. They propose that it should include
all interventions or failures to intervene - mainly in terms of medical treat-
ment - that shorten life or mean that life is not prolonged.4 The two "sides"
2. For a discussion of the difference between the use of language to "talk about" an
activity (e.g. law or psychiatry) and "to do" that same activity, see, M.A. Somerville, "Labels
vs. Contents: Variance between Psychiatry, Philosophy and Law in Concepts Governing Deci-
sion-Making" (forthcoming publication).
3. D. Humphry, Final Exit (Oregon: The Hemlock Society, 1991).
4. M.A. Somerville, "The Definition of Euthanasia - A Paradoxical Partnership",
Bioethics Research Notes 1991; 3(3):17-18.
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have, however, argued for this wide definition for exactly the opposite rea-
sons. The pro-choice group argue for a broad definition of euthanasia in
order to propose that all interventions or non-interventions that would pro-
mote a "good death" should be allowed, including those undertaken with a
primary intention of killing the person subject to them. Some pro-life groups
argue that all interventions or non-interventions that would shorten life
should be prohibited, not just those undertaken with a primary intention of
killing the person.
I have argued elsewhere5 that the pro-life groups who have taken this po-
sition, have done much harm to the cause of those who are against euthana-
sia, in the narrow sense defined below, but who would allow valid refusals of
treatment; with-holding or withdrawal of futile treatment or that in which
the harms of the treatment are disproportional to any benefit it offers; and
access to necessary pain relief treatment, even that which could shorten life,
if this is reasonably necessary to relieve pain and similarly access to treat-
ment for the relief of other symptoms of serious physical distress (for exam-
ple, intractable vomiting).6 To define these interventions or non-
interventions as euthanasia, forces persons to take a position either for or
against all interventions or non-interventions which could result in the short-
ening of life, and does not allow them to take a separate position on the issue
of euthanasia in a narrow sense of this term. In other words, pursuant to
such an approach, persons must be either in favour of allowing all such in-
terventions or non-interventions, or against all of them. It is proposed that
the acceptability of various interventions or non-interventions at the end of
life, varies from moral, ethical, legal, medical, social and societal points of
view, and that these different acts or omissions cannot be dealt with as a
unified whole. In short, the full spectrum of issues raised by medical inter-
vention or non-intervention in our dying, should not be included in one
term, as occurs when the word euthanasia is used to cover all means of pro-
moting "good (or less bad) deaths" as the pro-choice groups argue, or all
interventions or non-interventions that could result in shortening of life as
some pro-life groups argue. The terms in this most important, sensitive,
5. Ibid..
6. It could be argued that the inclusion of this latter exception opens up the possibility of
extending the range of interventions which I argue should be permitted, to include those that
would constitute euthanasia, as defined below. It is proposed that this will not occur, if we
respect the principle of treating the patient's symptoms by an intervention, and not seeking to
eliminate the patient in order to eliminate the symptoms. Further, the occasions on which
treatment of this kind that may shorten life would be needed, would be very infrequent. (Per-
sonal communication, Professor Norelle Lickiss, Director, Palliative Care Services, Royal
Prince Alfred Hospital, Sydney Australia, December 1992.)
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nuanced and delicate area need to be precisely used. In particular, the term
euthanasia needs to be very precisely used.
With the above in mind, it is proposed that euthanasia be defined as AN
INTERVENTION OR A NON-INTERVENTION BY ONE PERSON, TO END THE
LIFE OF ANOTHER PERSON, WHO IS TERMINALLY ILL, FOR THE PURPOSE OF
RELIEVING SUFFERING, WITH THE INTENT7 OF CAUSING THE DEATH8 OF
THE OTHER PERSON, EXCEPT WHERE THE PRIMARY INTENT IS EITHER TO
PROVIDE TREATMENT NECESSARY FOR THE RELIEF OF PAIN OR OTHER
SYMPTOMS OF SERIOUS PHYSICAL DISTRESS, OR NON-PROVISION OR WITH-
DRAWAL OF TREATMENT IS JUSTIFIED, IN PARTICULAR, BECAUSE THERE IS
A VALID REFUSAL OF TREATMENT OR THE TREATMENT IS FUTILE. This
definition excludes the provision of reasonably necessary treatment for the
relief of pain or other symptoms of serious physical distress, which could or
would shorten life, provided that, although there could be an intent to cause
death in giving such treatment, the primary intent is to relieve the pain or
other symptoms of serious physical distress, not to cause death. The defini-
tion also excludes justified with-holding or withdrawal of treatment, in par-
7. Normally, in law one is responsible for acts which one intends. Intention to kill an-
other person, in a legal sense, is present when either there is a desire to kill the other person, or
death is the certain or almost certain result of the act or omission (in a situation in which there
is a duty to act) in question. The difficulty, in the context of the present discussion, is to
establish legal immunity for (i) giving adequate treatment for the relief of pain or other symp-
toms of serious physical distress, even when this could shorten life, if this is reasonably neces-
sary to relieve pain or other symptoms of serious physical distress (which would be given with
an intention to kill, in the technical legal sense, if the treatment was certain or almost certain
to shorten life); and (ii) respecting valid refusals of treatment; and (iii) with-holding or with-
drawing futile treatment, when this will or could result in death; while prohibiting other inter-
ventions undertaken with an intention to cause death. There are two possible approaches.
Either to define euthanasia as including all interventions in which there is an intention to cause
death, except the provision of reasonably necessary treatment for the relief of pain or other
symptoms of serious physical distress, or respect for a valid refusal of treatment, or with-
holding or withdrawing futile treatment. Or, alternatively, one can require a motive to kill
(which is not present in giving treatment necessary to relieve pain or other symptoms of seri-
ous physical distress, or in respecting a valid refusal of treatment, or with-holding or with-
drawing futile treatment) as part of the definition of euthanasia. The former approach is
adopted here. It should be noted that in this text, the terms primary intent, primary purpose
and motive are used synonymously. The term direct intent is not used, but also, means the
same.
8. In general, I have chosen to use the term "to cause death", rather than "to kill", but
these terms can be synonymous. It is interesting to consider the difference in nuance between
the two terms, and to compare them with the term "to allow to die". The words "to kill" most
often are used to describe interventions or non-interventions causing death, that are regarded
as unjustifiable. In contrast, "allowing to die" tends to be used to describe non-interventions
that are regarded as justifiable. The provision of reasonably necessary pain relief treatment
that could or would shorten life is an intervention often referred to as causing death, but not in
general as killing, probably because it is regarded as justified, indeed, required. For a discus-
sion of futility, see Addendum p. 76.
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ticular, respect for valid refusals of treatment 9 on the basis that, in such
cases, first, there is no intention to cause death, although there is an inten-
tion to allow the person to die; second, the primary intent is either to respect
the person's right to refuse treatment or not to impose futile or useless treat-
ment; and, third, death is not caused, from the perspective of the law, by the
failure to provide or by the withdrawal of treatment, rather it is caused by
the person's underlying condition.
It should be noted that the proposed definition covers both voluntary and
involuntary euthanasia, that is, euthanasia with or without the informed
consent of the person subject to it, and is limited to terminal illness, and
requires a purpose of relief of suffering. This can be compared with, for
example, the definition given by the Netherlands' State Commission on Eu-
thanasia in 1985:
"Euthanasia is the deliberate action to terminate life, by someone
other than, and on the request of, the patient concerned".' 0
First, this definition covers only voluntary euthanasia, that is, on the request
and with the consent of a competent person. There is on-going debate about
involuntary euthanasia in The Netherlands and whether or not this should
be allowed, and some recent, disturbing evidence in this respect. It appears
that some Dutch physicians have used the definition of euthanasia currently
accepted in their country, which only includes "voluntary" interventions, to
classify "involuntary" interventions undertaken with a primary intention of
causing the death of the person as not constituting euthanasia, precisely be-
cause these interventions were not voluntary.'" It would seem that these
physicians have not regarded involuntary euthanasia as prohibited because it
did not fall within the guidelines compliance with which has the effect of
providing immunity from prosecution euthanasia. Rather, they appear to
9. A valid refusal of treatment is an informed refusal of treatment given by either a
competent adult person or a factually competent minor; or a refusal pursuant to a valid ad-
vance directive, whether in the form of a "living will" or a durable power of attorney for health
care, or given by some other legally recognized substitute decision-maker, when such a refusal
is within the scope of the aut hority of this decision-maker.
10. Cited in H. Rigter, "Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Distinguishing Facts from Fic-
tion", Hastings Center Report 1989; 19(l)(Spec. Supp.):31. The term deliberate action can be
compared with that used in this text of primary intention. It may or may not mean the same.
One problem with using the term deliberate action as part of a definition of euthanasia, is that,
at least, in legal systems based on Anglo-American common law, it has no specific meaning
and would, therefore, be likely to lead to further confusion.
11. See, A.M. Capron, "Euthanasia in the Netherlands: American Observations", Has-
tings Center Report 1992; 22(2):30,31, referring to the Remmelink Report, which is summa-
rized in P.J. van der Mass, J.J.M. van Delden, L. Pijnenborg, and C.W.N. Looman,
"Euthanasia and other medical decisions concerning the end of life", The Lancet 1991; ii:669-
674.
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have regarded such interventions as not requiring compliance with the
guidelines and procedural safeguards applicable to euthanasia, in particular,
those requiring that the person on whom euthanasia is carried out be compe-
tent and consenting, and reporting of each act of euthanasia. This is a strik-
ing example of use of the power of definition. In fact, it is to turn the
definition of euthanasia "on its head" to achieve exactly the opposite result
from that which it is intended to promote, namely, that only voluntary eu-
thanasia will be undertaken, and this only when there is compliance with
strict procedural safeguards. As de Wachter warns, "definitions are not
morally neutral. They are not just innocent tools that allow us to describe
reality. Rather they shape our perceptions of reality ...,, 2 and, one could
add, our actions based on those perceptions.
Second, the definition of the Netherlands State Commission on Euthana-
sia does not necessarily limit euthanasia to terminally ill persons. Although
judicial guidelines 3 in The Netherlands only allow euthanasia for terminally
ill persons, euthanasia has been held to be legitimate in the case, for example,
of a quadriplegic young woman, who requested it and who was not within
any usual definition of being terminally ill.14 There are arguments for and
against including terminal illness as a criterion in the definition of euthana-
sia. Arguments against it include that terminal illness is difficult to define, or
at least is an arbitrary determination (at one extreme, life can be seen as a
fatal illness) and is even more difficult to apply in practice - for instance, it
may be difficult to say that a person is very likely to die within a given short
period of time, when such a prediction is required in order for the person to
be regarded as terminally ill. Another approach is to leave it to the discre-
tion of physicians to determine when a person is terminally ill, in any given
case. Although this would act as a restriction on euthanasia, in general,
because there would need to be some objective reality to a finding that a
person is terminally ill, it may be too open-ended and open to abuse. Fur-
ther, if a similar use were made of a definition of euthanasia that included
terminal illness as a criterion, to that which occurred in relation to the
Dutch definition that euthanasia be voluntary (requiring that euthanasia be
voluntary was interpreted to mean that involuntary euthanasia was not eu-
12. M.A.M. de Wachter, "Euthanasia in The Netherlands", Hastings Center Report 1992;
22(2):23.
13. Rigter, supra, note 10, p.31. On February 9, 1993, the Second Chamber of Parliament
in The Netherlands passed, by a vote 91-45 in favour, a bill approving the regulatory system
set up by these judicial guidelines. The Bill now goes to the First Chamber for consideration.
See also, infra, p.35 et seq. and note 126.
14. R. Doerflinger, "Assisted Suicide: Pro-Choice or Anti-Life?", Hastings Center Report
1989; 19(l)(Spec. Supp.):16,18.
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thanasia' 5), then killing persons who were not terminally ill might not be
regarded as euthanasia. Moreover, in a context in which euthanasia was
allowed, such cases may not be regarded as homicide because these cases
have all the features, other than terminal illness, required to make them eu-
thanasia, not homicide.
Third, the Netherlands Commission's definition does not, expressly, re-
quire that the person be experiencing severe and untreatable suffering, but
this, also, is one of the conditions required if Dutch physicians, who carry
out euthanasia, are to be immune from criminal prosecution. 6 Fourth, the
definition does not limit the carrying out of euthanasia to physicians which
is, also, required for immunity under the Netherlands' guidelines.' 7
It would also seem that the Netherlands Commission's definition of eutha-
nasia only extends to acts, although the phrase, "the deliberate action to
terminate life", could include withdrawal or omission of treatment, for ex-
ample, unplugging a respirator or with-holding artificial hydration and nu-
trition. This leads to consideration of the much criticized active/passive
(act/omission) distinction in relation to euthanasia - the distinction between
so-called actively killing ("active euthanasia") and killing by either not pro-
viding or withdrawing treatment ("passive euthanasia"). It is agreed, that
the terms "active" and "passive" are confusing when applied to euthanasia
and that the distinction between "active" and "passive" euthanasia can be an
artificial one' 8 and should be abandoned in order to define euthanasia pre-
cisely. 9 Some failures to provide or withdrawals of treatment should be
classified as euthanasia, but others should not. In particular, respect for
valid refusals of treatment should not be characterized as euthanasia. For
example, respecting a competent adult patient's informed refusal of life-sup-
port treatment,20 or of blood transfusions for religious reasons2' which could
or will in all probability result in death, should not be regarded as euthanasia
15. Supra, p.5.
16. Rigter, supra, note 10, p.3 1.
17. Ibid..
18. See, for example, H. Kuhse, The Sanctity-of-Life Doctrine in Medicine - A Critique,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).
19. See, Law Reform Commission of Canada, "Euthanasia, Aiding Suicide and Cessation
of Treatment" Working Paper 28, Protection of Life Series, Minister of Supply and Services,
Ottawa, 1982, pp.7-8, p.4 3.
20. See, for example, Nancy B. (N.) v. Hdtel-Dieu de Quibec [1992] R.J.Q. 361 (S.C.QuE.).
[Hereinafter Nancy B.]
21. See, for example, Malette v. Shulman (1990) 67 D.L.R. (4th) 321; 72 O.R. (2nd) 417
(C.A.Ont.), in which the Ontario Court of Appeal awarded $(C)20,000 damages for battery, to
a woman who was given a blood transfusion which saved her life after being admitted to a
hospital emergency room in a semi-conscious state, but carrying a card stating she was a Jeho-
vah's Witness and refused all blood products or blood transfusions.
1993]
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and confused with this. This is not to say, however, that one cannot disagree
with both euthanasia and respecting rights to refuse treatment. Euthanasia
involves an intention to cause death which, it is proposed, apart from neces-
sary treatment for the relief of pain or other symptoms of serious physical
distress that could be given with this intention, is always wrong. With-hold-
ing or withdrawing treatment involves an intention of allowing the person to
die. Sometimes, this is not justified when it should be regarded as constitut-
ing, or as equivalent to, an intention to cause death and characterized as
euthanasia. Sometimes, allowing a person to die is justified (when it is pur-
suant to a valid refusal of treatment or any treatment is futile) in which cases
it should not be regarded as euthanasia.
In. short, one can have euthanasia, in the narrow sense of this term, by
omission as well as by act. What is important is to distinguish omissions
that constitute euthanasia from omissions of treatment which do not consti-
tute euthanasia.
There is sometimes a fine line between allowing a person to die and caus-
ing the death of another person. This is especially true in relation to with-
drawing or not providing treatment other than pursuant to a competent
patient's informed refusal of treatment or "advance directives" to this effect.
But the important point is that there is a line and, it is proposed, the nature
of interventions on one side of this line is different in kind from those on the
other side. In another context, I have described such lines as "marker
events,"22 such that what occurs on one side of the line can be seen as differ-
ent in kind, in particular regarding precedent setting effect, from that which
occurs on the other side of the line. In relation to differentiating conduct
that constitutes euthanasia from that which does not, the "marker event" is
comprised of a "mens rea" (state of mind) of an intention to cause death and
an "actus reus" (conduct) of an act or omission that causes, in the legal sense
of this term, the death of the other person, except where the situation in-
volves the provision of necessary treatment for the relief of pain or other
symptoms of serious physical distress.
It needs to be considered how we can justify failure to provide or with-
drawal of treatment in cases that involve either a valid refusal of treatment
or in which the treatment is futile or disproportional. These can be dealt
with on the basis of either intention or causation. In such cases, there is an
intention to allow the person to die when it is certain, or almost certain, that
death will result from the "act" or omission in question. But not all acts or
omissions that allow a person to die are equivalent to an intention to cause
22. M.A. Somerville, "Birth and Life: Establishing a Framework of Concepts", (1989) 21
Connecticut Law Review, 667-683.
[Vol. 9:1
The Song of Death
death and culpable. In particular acting pursuant to a valid refusal of treat-
ment is a non-culpable act or omission, although there is an intention to
allow the person to die. Indeed, not acting in this way could be culpable. To
impose treatment on a patient who refuses it, is usually battery23 and could
constitute criminal assault.
Yet, another possible legal analysis that results in the same outcome, is
that in some circumstances there is no duty to treat or to continue treatment
and, therefore, an omission to treat in such circumstances that results in
death is not legally actionable. This would not seem to be a strong argu-
ment, especially as, when a person is in a "treatment relationship" with a
physician, omissions are not likely to be held to be "mere" omissions which
do not attract legal liability. Rather these omissions of treatment would
need to be justified on some other basis such as a valid refusal or futility of
the omitted treatment. An alternative or additional analysis leading to the
same result, is that the intentional act (for example, turning off the respira-
tor) is not, in law, the cause of the person's death, rather, the person dies
from his or her underlying disease. Those who oppose euthanasia, but agree
with respecting refusals of treatment even when this could or will result in
death, may have made a mistake in denying that, as in euthanasia, their
actions in such circumstances involve an intention to allow the person to die
or even to cause death. They do involve such an intention, but intention
alone does not make an act culpable. The act must be regarded by the law as
the cause of the prohibited outcome, here death of the person. The person's
death is caused in fact by the act of treatment withdrawal and by the under-
lying disease. In contrast, the person's death is caused in law only by the
underlying disease when the withdrawal of treatment is justified, and this
"cause" is not one which attracts legal liability. In other words the with-
drawal of treatment is not regarded in law as the cause of the person's
death.24 This can be compared with giving a person a lethal injection. The
injection is the sole cause of the person's death and is clearly the cause of this
in fact and in law, and is a "cause" that attracts legal liability.
The argument that there is no justifiable distinction between "active" and
"passive" euthanasia (which is correct, if, in each case, euthanasia, as de-
fined above, is involved) and, therefore, that there is no justifiable distinc-
23. See, for example, Malette v. Shulman, supra, note 21.
24. It is recognized that deciding when justification is present and when it is not and
consequently when there is not and is causation-in-law, respectively, is a value judgment. But
this does not mean that distinctions based on such a judgment are illegitimate or simply arbi-
trary or a matter of semantics, as is argued by some persons who support euthanasia.
19931
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tion between euthanasia and respecting persons' refusals of treatment, 25 has
been put to a further use, recently. It could be that confusion between "pas-
sive" euthanasia and respecting persons' refusals of treatment, has been gen-
erated, deliberately, in the case of the pro-choice on euthanasia groups, in
order to convince people that their agreeing with rights to refuse treatment
means that they - as logical, rational and consistent thinkers - must agree
with euthanasia and, moreover, that in respecting refusals of treatment they
.are committing euthanasia.26 It also seems to be implied that if these per-
sons feel comfortable with having carried out "euthanasia" of this kind, that
is, by respecting persons' refusals of treatment, they should feel equally com-
fortable with undertaking euthanasia as defined in this text. Similarly, some
groups in the anti-euthanasia movement seek to eliminate any distinction
between so-called "active" and "passive" euthanasia, it would seem for the
same purpose, namely, to argue that agreeing with so-called "passive" eutha-
nasia, necessarily, implies agreeing with "active" euthanasia - if one is to be
logical, rational and consistent. They do this, however, to promote the op-
posite result, namely, that, therefore, both "active" and "passive" euthanasia
should be opposed and prohibited.
Yet another "pro-euthanasia" argument, a sophisticated one, also based
on regarding rights to refuse treatment as a form of euthanasia, has recently
appeared in the Harvard Law Review.27 To summarize, this argument is
that to recognize patients' refusals of treatment recognizes a "right to die".
It is, then, proposed that if there is a "right to die", there are no convincing
moral, political, social or legal distinctions between allowing somebody to
die from an underlying disease through non-treatment, pursuant to his or
her refusal of that treatment, or helping the person to die with active assist-
ance. 2  This "right to be assisted in dying" is argued to include a right to
choose and to control the time, place, conditions and manner of one's dying,
whether through "passive" or "active" means.29 This argument interprets
recognition by some courts of a "right to die" as, not only, encompassing a
right to be allowed to die, for instance by refusing treatment, but also, a right
25. See, for example, D.W. Brock, "Voluntary Active Euthanasia", Hastings Center Re-
port 1992; 22(2):10,19.
26. A recent newspaper report of a survey of nurses in the State of Victoria, Australia,
suggests that the survey may have asked questions which could have been interpreted in this
way. See "Nurses Admit Helping Eighty to Die", [Adelaide, Australia] The Advertiser, 2
March 1992, p. 3 .
27. Notes: "Physician Assisted Suicide: The Right to Die With Assistance", (1992) 105
Harvard Law Review, 2021.
28. See, also, G.P. Smith, II, "All's Well That Ends Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted
Suicide or Merely Enlightened Self-Determination?", (1989) 22 University of California Davis
Law Review, 275.
29. Notes: Harvard Law Review, supra, note 27.
[Vol. 9:1
The Song of Death
to be assisted in dying, in the sense of euthanasia as defined in this text.
None of the cases in which courts have, with respect, loosely, used the term
"a right to die", contemplated legitimizing euthanasia through use of such
language. One question, therefore, is whether these cases do provide any
precedent for a "right to die with assistance" as is proposed.
The term "a right to be assisted in dying", standing alone, is ambiguous.
It could be meant to articulate only a right to palliative care and an obliga-
tion to provide this, and as Capron eloquently states, "[t]here are so many
things - including simple companionship and love - that one might do to
'aid' a dying person, that the phrase 'aid-in-dying' cannot help but disguise
more than it reveals". 30 The Harvard Law Review article is clear, however,
that what is meant is that there should be immunity for the physician for
killing the patient, when this action fulfils certain conditions.3" It is also
possible that a right to die could have a juridical correlate of an obligation to
kill the person with the right. This possibility is rejected: ". . . the right to
die with assistance would provide only a right against state interference, not
a right to force an unwilling physician to assist in a patient's suicide."32
The "language of euthanasia" is discussed in more detail later,3 3 but this
use of language in the article merits noting. It is much more difficult to
oppose a "right against state interference" in medical decisions at the end of
life (a characterization which can include euthanasia, as defined), than an
immunity for a physician who kills a patient. Yet, the two are identical in
content and result.
The argument for a right to die with assistance is supported in the
Harvard Law Review article, paradoxically, by a close investigation of how
the American courts have not recognized an absolute right of persons to
refuse treatment and by equating this to a "right to die". The authors
demonstrate that American courts have put conditions on exercising the
right to refuse treatment, and therefore, it is argued, on the "right to die".
In particular, the courts have balanced the exercise of this "right" against
"state interests in preserving life, protecting third parties, and preserving the
medical profession's ethical image",34 any one of which can be given prior-
ity. These cases show, the authors propose, that in some situations (those
where there are no over-riding state interests), but not all (those where there
are over-riding state interests), a person's refusal of treatment, which will
result in death, will be respected: that is, the person has a "right to die". It
30. Capron, supra, note 11, p.30 .
31. Notes: Harvard Law Review, supra, note 27.
32. Ibid., p.2024.
33. Infra pp. 44-56.
34. Notes: Harvard Law Review, supra, note 27, p.2 0 2 2 .
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is, then, argued that if none of these same state interests would be contra-
vened by "assisting death" (which it is proposed they would not be in some
cases), there is, likewise, no reason not to assist death in such cases, through
"active means".
This position can be compared with that, for example, in the Common
Law jurisdictions of Canada and the Civil Law jurisdiction of Quebec, in
which the right to refuse treatment tends to be regarded as much more abso-
lute35 and, possibly, of a different nature or origin. The Canadian approach
has been to focus on the person's right not to be touched without his or her
consent - the right to inviolability36 - rather than on any "right to die".
These cases which recognize a more absolute right to refuse treatment, pur-
suant to respect for a right to inviolability, in fact, do not lend themselves so
readily, if at all, to the type of argument outlined above.
There is a valuable lesson to be learned from the possible consequences,
such as those described above, of promoting a non-absolute approach to the
right to refuse treatment. What would appear to be initially a more life-
favouring position (and one promoted by some pro-life groups), namely that
the right to refuse treatment is not absolute, can in fact be used to achieve
exactly the opposite outcome, and indeed used in support of the pro-choice
on euthanasia position, as occurs in the Harvard Law Review article
discussed.
Pain relief treatment, which could or even would shorten life, but which is
reasonably necessary to relieve pain, can also be seen as raising difficulties
with respect to intention to cause death and potential criminal liability.
Such treatment must be able to be given with legal immunity. Consequently,
where the motive is to relieve pain and not to kill, the intervention must be
justified, despite the possible presence in a technical legal sense of an inten-
tion that death will result.37 In other words, motive can be regarded as an
excuse or a justification - a defence - protecting against or negating, respec-
tively, criminal or other liability in such circumstances, which is the analysis
most consistent with traditional theory in criminal law.38 We need also to
35. See, M.A. Somerville, "Refusal of Medical Treatment in 'Captive' Circumstances",
(1985) 63 Canadian Bar Review, 1:59-90.
36. For a discussion of the differences and relationship between rights to inviolability and
to autonomy, see, M.A. Somerville, "Consent to Medical Care", Law Reform Commission of
Canada, Ottawa, 1983.
37. There is increasing evidence, however, that medically advanced pain relief regimes do
not shorten life, in which case concerns that they do, may become obsolete. Personal commu-
nication Professor Norelle Lickiss, Director, Palliative Care Services, Royal Prince Alfred
Hospital, Sydney, Australia, December 1992.
38. M.A. Somerville, "Medical Interventions and the Criminal Law: Lawful or Excusa-
ble Wounding?", (1980) 26 McGill Law Journal, 82-96.
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keep in mind that providing adequate pain relief treatment could extend life,
as the person is less physically and psychologically distressed, in which case
failure to provide it shortens life.
The subject of pain relief treatment is a critical one in the context of a
discussion of euthanasia. Fears of being left in unbearable pain, or even
more horrific, the reality of this occurring, which still far too often happens,
is probably a strong impetus for many persons to argue that euthanasia
should be made available. We need to be acutely aware that some of our
attitudes and systems contribute to failure to provide adequate pain relief
treatment. For instance, I recently learnt of a case in which a man, dying of
disseminated carcinoma, was being given Tylenolg for severe pain. A phy-
sician on night rotation changed the order to morphine. The next night, she
was again called to see the man, because he was in very severe pain. She
found that during the intervening day, the man's attending physician had
cancelled the order for morphine and written another order for Tylenolo.
When questioned, the attending physician said that he thought the man was
"a complainer" and, in any case, he did not want to have "addicted pa-
tients", two responses that one would hope not to hear from any physician
practising medicine in the 1990's. In another case, I was told that a young
resident considered giving a dose of potassium chloride to a dying patient in
severe pain, because the hospital ward supply of morphine had run out that
night and no more could be obtained until the hospital pharmacy opened the
next morning. We must ensure that not only health care practitioners are
humane, but also, that we have humane systems in our health care institu-
tions.3 9 The most effective and important means of achieving this in the area
of medical interventions at the end of life, is to promote the teaching and
provision of high standards of palliative care. All physicians need some fa-
miliarity with the concept and practice of this area of medicine, as well as
there being a need for specialization in it.
Leaving people in pain is not only a human tragedy and contrary to the
most fundamental concepts of human rights, it should be treated as at least
legally actionable medical malpractice and possibly as a crime. Certainly, to
provide necessary pain relief treatment, even that which could shorten life,
must not be seen as criminal. This has been explored in much greater depth
elsewhere,' the point here is that those who oppose euthanasia, but fail to
39. It, also, merits considering whether establishing a system, such as that described,
could be regarded as "systems negligence" and, therefore, could give rise to a possible action in
negligence directly against the hospital, for damages by persons who are harmed as a result.
See Yepremian v. Scarborough General Hospital (1980) 110 D.L.R. (3d) 513 (C.A. Ont.).
40. M.A. Somerville, "Pain and Suffering at Interfaces of Medicine and Law", (1986)
XXXVI University of Toronto Law Journal, 286-317.
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take steps to ensure that adequate pain relief treatment is provided (or even
worse, oppose this, if it could shorten life) do much to promote the case for
euthanasia.
In summary, no matter whether one promotes the view that euthanasia
should be available to those who request it or believes that euthanasia should
be prohibited, it is important to deal with the various situations, which re-
quire decision-making concerning interventions at the end of life, separately
from each other. In particular, situations which involve an intention to
cause death should be dealt with separately from other situations in which
there is no such intention, and within the former group further distinctions
are necessary. In order to undertake such a discussion, the terminology
must be very clear. Consequently, in the remainder of this text, to repeat,
the term "euthanasia" is used in the strict sense of meaning an intervention
(other than the provision of reasonably necessary treatment for the relief of
pain or other symptoms of serious physical distress) or a non-intervention
(other than pursuant to a valid refusal of treatment or where the treatment is
futile) undertaken for the purpose of relieving suffering in circumstances of
terminal illness, with the intention of causing the death of the person who is
subject to the intervention or non-intervention. A narrow definition is
needed because euthanasia, as defined, is different in kind not just degree
from other measures, which can also mean that life is not prolonged or even
that death is "caused" in the sense that it occurs sooner than it would other-
wise do. In particular, it is argued that the "analogy between forgoing treat-
ment and active euthanasia is simply false". 4 ' Most persons who are in
favour of euthanasia would disagree with this statement. They argue that
the outcome is the same - namely death - and that once allowing death to
occur is justified, how this is brought about is morally, and ought to be le-
gally, irrelevant.42 Recognizing for the sake of argument that this could be
true, does not justify making it true by treating all interventions at the end of
life as the same, in particular, regardless of whether or not they involve an
intention or a primary intention to cause death. Rather, each category of
intervention needs separate justification, if it is to be justified.
If one imagines a continuum with a very liberal pro-euthanasia position at
one end and a very stringent pro-life position at the other, the position which
is being advocated in this text is somewhere in the middle. This position is
much more difficult to articulate, define and defend than either of the poles,
and moreover one can be and is attacked from both sides. In part this may
explain why some persons choose one or the other pole. I have suggested
41. de Wachter, supra, note 12, referring to arguments presented by Capron.
42. See, for example, Notes: Harvard Law Review, supra, note 27.
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elsewhere that living in "the purple-pink middle" may represent what we
see, at least initially, as an "impossible combination" of attitudes, values and
beliefs.43 But while it is usually the most difficult position, it may also be the
most honest one, in that it best accommodates and even reconciles what we
say and what we do. It is proposed that the most acceptable position with
respect to interventions or non-interventions at the end of life, is to recognize
rights to adequate treatment for the relief of pain and other symptoms of
serious physical distress, and rights to refuse treatment, and that there is no
obligation to provide futile treatment, even when any of these approaches
could or will shorten life, and to prohibit all other interventions or non-
interventions undertaken with an intent of causing the death of the person to
whom they relate.
II. THE CONTEXT OF DISCUSSION OF EUTHANASIA
There is wide-spread discussion of euthanasia. This discussion ranges
from cartoons, to the pulpit, to Parliament. For example, a recent "Far
Side" cartoon showed an old rooster lying in bed, hooked up to many life-
support machines, being visited by his hen-wife. The wife says to him: "It is
a miracle you have survived, George. Just yesterday, we were wondering
whether or not to wring your neck". Media coverage of euthanasia has been
intensive - although, there seems to be much misconception in the media as
to what constitutes euthanasia, in particular, it is confused with respecting
refusals of life-sustaining treatment, and one can only question whether or
not this is intentional."
Political debate concerning euthanasia and related issues has been intense
and has included, for example, in North America, the California Humane
and Dignified Death Initiative (Physician Assisted Death Bill), which failed
to obtain sufficient signatures to be submitted to a ballot in 1988; the sequel
to this just voted on by Californian electors, November 3, 1992 and defeated
by a 54% to 46% margin;45 the Washington State Initiative 119, of 1991,
which was rejected by voters; and two Private Members Bills introduced into
the Canadian Parliament in 1991 - one seeking to clarify that persons who
respect others' rights to refuse treatment or who provide pain relief treat-
43. See M.A. Somerville, "New Perceptions, Old Values From Inner and Outer Spaces",
Canadian Speeches 1992; 6(5):65-68. (Convocation Address, "Spacing-in and Spacing-out:
Searching for the Purple-Pink Middle", University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, June 1992.)
44. For example, the Nancy B. case (supra, note 20), a recent court case in Canada, in
which the request of a young, competent, quadriplegic woman to be disconnected from a respi-
rator was upheld, was, frequently, discussed in the media in terms of euthanasia.
45. "California voters reject doctor-aided suicides", Associated Press/Southam News,
[Montreal] The Gazette, 5 November 1992; p.Al 1.
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ment, even that which could shorten life, but which is necessary to relieve
pain, are not thereby liable to criminal prosecution,4" the other going far
beyond this, to propose a system of legalized euthanasia for Canada47 . Both
of these Bills have now lapsed.
There is, also, wide-ranging academic discussion and research being un-
dertaken in this area. Just one example, is the current work of Young, who
has investigated self-willed or other-willed death in eastern religions, in or-
der, through comparative religion methodologies and techniques, to gain in-
sights into how we are handling and should handle issues surrounding
euthanasia in our societies.4" It merits noting that her preliminary results
show that when a society is either "too religious" or "too secular", there is a
similar increase in belief at both individual and societal levels, that euthana-
sia is acceptable. Once again, seeking the balance of the "purple-pink mid-
dle",49 in this instance between religiosity and secularity, would seem to be
an important safeguard.
Quite apart from the arguments raised either for or against euthanasia,
and by whom and in what manner these are being explored or promoted, the
"context" or forum, itself, in which the euthanasia debate takes place, is not
necessarily a neutral factor, but can be a "player" in the discussion. For
instance, it has been alleged that "[t]he [Dutch] media have been virtually
monopolized by the euthanasia proponents, and a whole generation of
Dutch people has been raised without even hearing any serious opposition to
it,,. 50
Further, some events, for example, the fact that Derek Humphry's book
on how to commit suicide, Final Exit, which strongly advocates euthanasia,
was number one on the New York's Times Best-Seller List, have an effect on
the context of the discussion of euthanasia, as a whole. Moreover, that it
became a best-seller can be interpreted in radically different ways. On the
one hand, it can be argued that this shows that the book is needed and is
acceptable. On the other hand, it can be argued that this indicates that the
46. Bill C-203, "An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (terminally ill persons)", The
House of Commons of Canada, 3rd Session, 34th Parliament, 40 Elizabeth II, 1991. First
reading May 16, 1991; the Bill failed on second reading in January 1992.
47. Bill C-261, "Euthanasia and Cessation of Treatment Act", The House of Commons of
Canada, 3rd Session, 34th Parliament, 40 Elizabeth II, 1991. First reading June 19, 1991. The
Bill was withdrawn, prior to second reading.
48. K. Young, "Euthanasia: Traditional Hindu Views and the Contemporary Debate", in
H.C. Coward, J.J. Lipner, K.K. Young, Hindu Ethics: Purity, Abortion and Euthanasia (Al-
bany: State University of New York Press, 1989).
49. Somerville, supra, note 43.
50. R. Fenigsen, "A Case Against Dutch Euthanasia", Hastings Center Report 1989;
19(l)(Spec. Supp.):22,24.
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book has a morbid appeal and could foster psychopathological tendencies -
for instance, suicide by seriously depressed persons - to the grave detriment
of persons with these tendencies. Certainly, there is a major difference, in-
cluding in practical impact, between this book and one that is similarly pro-
motive of the option of euthanasia, but is neither a "do-it-yourself"
euthanasia text, nor heavily promoted, as Final Exit was, to become a best-
seller.
The tone of the debate on euthanasia - whether relatively impartial or
partial - and, an often related characteristic, whether theoretical issues and
analysis or practical, how-to-commit euthanasia instructions are the focus of
the debate, also affect and change the context of that debate.
Moreover, as Wolf5 1 points out, not all contexts or the discussion which
takes place in them are equally accessible to or aimed at all persons. She
compares the "propaganda and diatribe"52 of Humphry in Final Exit, which
has clearly caught major public attention, with the perceived failure of
bioethics to label the issues raised by euthanasia in a broad enough manner
to engage in the "momentous public debate, with profound ethical, legal,
religious, psychological and medical implications' 53 , which must take place.
She argues that "bioethicists must strive to reach a popular audience and
convey arguments effectively". 54 In other words, it is the obligation of
bioethicists to ensure that the context of bioethics extends to encompass all
who should participate in the euthanasia debate, which must include the
public. This provides an insight, that definition of an appropriate context for
the euthanasia debate can be a way of expanding or limiting the participants
in the debate, which will undoubtedly affect the outcome of the debate. This
potential for manipulation needs to be recognized and steps taken to ensure
the widest possible participation.
III. WHY ARE WE TALKING OF EUTHANASIA Now?
(A) Is It an Indirect Way of Talking About Death?
We need to ask whether our "euthanasia talk" is covering-up some other
reality. There is much discussion of euthanasia, but, I suggest, less of death -
talking about death is difficult. Indeed, we have been described as a society
that is unusually fearful of death - a death-denying society.55 This term is





55. H. Becker, The Denial of Death (New York: The Free Press, 1973).
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interesting, because denial requires some minimal level of consciousness of
the "thing" feared, in order to suppress the larger consciousness of that
"thing". Could it be that euthanasia is the conscious mechanism that we use
to suppress our larger awareness of death? Is it less fearful to talk of eutha-
nasia than death and, consequently, our discussion of death is being carried
out in the context of euthanasia? We used to talk about death "in religion",
but the major decline in adherence to organized religion means that many of
us no longer talk about death in that context. In recent times, we have not
talked about death in any context, except possibly, in symbolic and ritual-
ized form in literature and the arts. Could it also be that talk of euthanasia
de-conditions us to the fear of death, especially, because at the same time as
we speak of the feared "event", we simultaneously speak of controlling it
through the use of euthanasia? As Winslade has said, "[t]he need to control
death whether by postponing it or hastening it - seems to rest on a deep fear
and denial".56 Could it even be that our "euthanasia talk" is a terror man-
agement device, for both individuals and society? Greenberg" and his col-
leagues propose that the thought of death raises the deepest terror, which we
then need to manage. We do this by seeking to achieve a consensus that
affirms our most important values, which, in turn, provides reassurance.
Could this explain the strong polarization and conflict on euthanasia, in that
each "side" wants consensus in order to have the reassurance that results
from having its values affirmed? Could it also be that this terror is so great
that we would rather be dead, than living in fear of death, particularly, im-
minent death, and euthanasia is seen as allowing us to achieve this outcome?
It seems that advocacy of euthanasia is connected with a desire for con-
trol. Control is related to relief of suffering. Suffering is present when one
has a sense of one's own disintegration and a loss of control over what hap-
pens to one.5" To move from chance, which the occurrence of death has
largely been, to choice, which is the promise of euthanasia, can be to reduce
suffering. Persons may see euthanasia as avoiding present suffering (either
because they seek euthanasia at the time, or because it allays present fears -
which are a form of suffering - that they can avoid suffering at some time in
the future) or future suffering. Euthanasia may, also, fulfil a need or desire
for certainty, which is related to a need or desire for control. Stated in an-
other way, euthanasia can be viewed as reducing uncertainty which reduces
56. Quoted in de Wachter, supra, note 12.
57. J. Greenberg, "At Different Times, in Different Ways, We All Board the Same Train:
The Management of Terror in Everyday Life", Plenary Address, 9th International Congress
on Care of the Terminally III, November 3, 1992, Montreal.
58. E. Cassel, "The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine", New England Jour-
nal of Medicine 1982; 306(11):639-644.
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anxiety, and, consequently, it provides reassurance. Euthanasia could also
be a "do something" response. When faced with fearful situations our anxi-
ety tends to be increased by inactivity and decreased by activity, because in
the latter case we feel that we can and are "doing something" to remedy the
situation. This also provides a feeling of greater control which likewise
reduces anxiety. Further, it is interesting to note in this context, that an
attitude on the part of physicians that is manifested in their telling patients
that they can do nothing more for them, may be a precipitating cause of
some patients seeking euthanasia.5 9
The availability of euthanasia could, also, inflict suffering. There could be
a fear that it would be practised in ways that would mean that the individual
loses rather than gains control. Similarly, there could be present fear about
future use of euthanasia - not simply fear at a future time about its use at
that time. It has been alleged that some old persons in The Netherlands fear
physicians and hospitals, because they fear that they may be subjected to
euthanasia.' That is, instead of giving more control to the individual, eu-
thanasia may, overall, result in less control. Even such situations as seeing
oneself as a burden on society when one is old and ill, and as needing to do
the "right thing" by requesting euthanasia is a loss of individual control and
freedom of spirit. Both the anticipation and experience of this are suffering
inflicting. It has, also, been suggested that allowing euthanasia means that
persons must face a choice whether or not to use it and could have to justify
their choice to continue existing, because "the existence of the option be-
comes a subtle pressure to request it".6 1 Situations that raise such issues are
very likely to be a source of suffering.
Euthanasia may, also, be a vehicle for addressing much wider and deeper
realities that operate at conscious, unconscious and symbolic levels.62 In a
study, currently in progress, Young et al. propose "that 'reason alone' has
never been the sole guiding principle by which individuals have killed them-
selves or others when ill or old. Rather, reason has often been used either to
affirm or to cover the operation of deeper values that are not expressly iden-
tified. These have included the heroic ideal of the self-willed death among
warriors threatened with defeat or the derivative ideal among ascetics or
philosophers of self-willed death to demonstrate their version of courage.
Unlike the ancient world's desire for a heroic form of death and Nazi Ger-
many's legitimation of euthanasia to create a 'super race', today's societies
59. See, L. Israel in interview with Jacques Nerson, "Pr. Lucien Israel: L'Euthanasia est
un meurtre", Le Figaro, 6 mars, 1993, 111-112, 111.
60. Fenigsen, supra, note 50, p.26 .
61. Brock, supra, note 25, p.17, referring to Velleman.
62. See, also, discussion, infra pp.28-31.
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are entertaining the idea of self-willed or assisted death to avoid suffering or
ensure 'dignity'. Since the pain of dying can be effectively treated in most
cases, what accounts for the current movement to legalize euthanasia?" 63
As well as seeking consensus on values for the sake of consensus, because we
need the reassurance that such consensus provides, 6" what deeper values
could we be seeking to affirm or to cover, in arguing for, or likewise against,
euthanasia?
The analysis of the French psychoanalyst, De Hennezel, is of great inter-
est in this respect, because it shows some of the enormous complexities we
are dealing with in our discussion of euthanasia. In particular, it shows that
two emotions, fear and love, and the relationship between them, are central
to the euthanasia debate. De Hennezel argues "that a fine death is an illu-
sion, a myth.., which people tell themselves to appease their anguish",65
and that our society is "governed by th[e] myth of a good death". 66 She
proposes that there are two versions of this myth. One view sees a "good
death" [as] ... a discreet and rapid death, unconscious, and, particularly, of
no bother to anyone else". 67 This corresponds to a view of the world in
which death is denied; medicine is all powerful; caregivers see death of their
patients as a failure; and death is "experienced in great solitude and with no
guideposts or values" 6 . This is "[a] world of effectivity, efficiency, perform-
ance, with priority given to cost-effectiveness [and] consumption . .. [a]
world of objects not of subjects - in short, a world stripped of souls and
spirit, a world without love". 69 The other view of a good death comes from
"a new humanism... try[ing] to bring life and death together as one. An
accompanied death, a socialized death, one experienced in lucidity up to the
end becomes the desired good death".70 The view of the world behind this
vision is a much less certain one. In fact, its essence is recognition: of the
uncertainty of many of us about the meaning of life and death; of the need
for sensitivity to others and the humility to allow others to experience in
their own, not our, way; and that there are possibilities of the extremes of
either "nothingness or . . .mystery of the beyond". 7 ' It is "an appeal to
63. K.K. Young et al., unpublished abstract (1992).
64. Supra, p.17.
65. M. de Hennezel "The Myth of the Perfect Death: The New Meaning of Death
in the Context of AIDS", Plenary Address, "Caring Together/Entraide: Conference Pro-




69. Ibid., see, also, Campion infra, note 97.
70. Ibid..
71. Ibid., p. 35.
[Vol. 9:1
The Song of Death
change our way of loving". 72 This "new concept of 'dying well' . . . is no
longer an illusion or a myth, but a permission to experience one's death as
one wishes, to experience it fully, with the assurance of being loved and ac-
cepted no matter what. This of course requires that someone else be capable
of that degree of true love".73
If we accept the propositions set out above, it could lead to the conclusion
that we should reject euthanasia, because it is too "easy", in the sense of
simplistic, rational, cold and unloving, as an approach or response in dealing
with death. And yet, those in favour of euthanasia argue exactly the con-
trary, namely, that euthanasia is among the great humanitarian causes.74
The important point to note here is that our arguments are of this nature.
This means that in dealing with euthanasia, we are dealing with some of the
most fundamental and critical issues of our humanness, as both individuals
and a society. In short, whether we are "pro" or "anti" euthanasia, we agree
that euthanasia is a central focus in our discussion of these fundamental is-
sues; where we disagree, is whether allowing or prohibiting euthanasia best
promotes our human spirit and our humaneness and humanity.
(B) Is There a Newly Perceived Need for Euthanasia?
Polls, for example, in California75 and The Netherlands76 have shown that
approximately 70% of persons approve of euthanasia being available and
this percentage seems to be increasing. But care needs to be taken with how
polls are interpreted, in that responses within the same survey may not be
consistent. For instance, some polls on abortion have shown that the major-
ity of persons approve of abortion on demand, but the same majority do not
approve of a woman having an abortion for any reason at all.77 Surveys on
willingness to donate organs give inconsistent results, in that, approximately
70% to 80% of persons declare themselves willing to donate, but only about
10% to 20% of these same persons have actually done so. 7 1 In short, there
may be a large gap, as is shown in Washington State by the recent vote on
72. Ibid..
73. Ibid..
74. L. Israel in interview with Jacques Nerson, supra, note 59, p. 112, referring to a state-
ment by Bernard Rapp.
75. A. Parachini, "The California Humane and Dignified Death Initiative", Hastings
Center Report 1989; 19(1)(Spec. Supp.): 11.
76. H.J.J. Leenen, "Euthanasia in the Netherlands", in Peter Byrne ed., Medicine, Medi-
cal Ethics and the Value of Life, (New York: Wiley, 1990), 1-14, 2.
77. W. Saletan, "There is No Pro-Choice Majority Either", The Wall Street Journal, 27
June 1990, p.A12.
78. L. Shelley, "Practical Issues in Obtaining Organs for Transplantation", Law,
Medicine and Health Care 1985; 13:35,37.
19931
22 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 9:1
"Initiative 119, A Voluntary Choice for Terminally Ill Persons: Death With
Dignity", between what we say we are willing to accommodate and what we
decide to accommodate, when it comes to making an actual rather than a
hypothetical decision. The polls, prior to the voting on the Initiative, indi-
cated that it would succeed, but it failed by a 46% to 54% margin.
Moreover, the results of polling 2,000 randomly chosen Washington State
physicians regarding this Initiative, 1,105 of whom responded, show compa-
rable discrepancies and have been described as "mystifying".79 "Seventy-
five percent of physicians said they did not believe they should have the legal
right to give a terminally ill patient a lethal injection. Sixty percent said
doctors should not be allowed to prescribe a lethal dose of medication to be
self-administered by the patient. And 75 percent said they would not be
willing to be personally involved in aiding a patient's death. Yet in answer
to the question, Should the WSMA [Washington State Medical Association]
support or oppose Initiative 119?, respondents were split down the middle,
with 543 doctors saying the WSMA should support the initiative, and 562
indicating the organization should oppose it. 's8 These results may contain
an important warning. First, it is possible that our sense of responsibility for
the outcomes of our decisions is diminished when that responsibility is
shared with a group and exercised through group decision-making. Second,
it could be that some physicians make decisions concerning their own con-
duct according to their own personal morality, but they do not necessarily
seek to impose the same morality on others. Third, discrepancies of the type
outlined above could show that we may need to talk about doing (or possibly
more accurately the doing of) some things that we would not do and do not
want others to do, that is, the discussion itself might have a purpose other
than promoting the carrying out of the conduct (here euthanasia) which
forms its content.81
The warning having been sounded, that what we say does not necessarily
reflect what we will do and that what we say may not be inherently consis-
tent, it is true, however, that there is a very major increase in most western
democracies, in the discussion of euthanasia and promotion of this as a valid
option that should be made available and, certainly, not prohibited. We
need to inquire why this is occurring. Why is there a perceived need for
euthanasia now?
79. R. Carson, "Washington's 1-119", Hastings Center Report 1992; 22(2):7,8.
80. Ibid..
81. See, infra, p.70.
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(i) Modern medical technology
Some people attribute the augmented perceived need for euthanasia as be-
ing yet one more effect of modem medical technology. It is possible that our
sense of "playing God" to keep alive, persons who in past times would cer-
tainly have been dead, may have given us a sense of power not only over
death, but also over life. 2 In short, once we use technology to prolong life,
perhaps, there is some correlative sense in which we feel we may use it to
shorten life. Certainly, we do not need new technology to kill; this possibil-
ity is as old as the human species, itself.
It may be, however, that a fear of the over-use of medical technology has
contributed to calls for euthanasia. This fear is summed up in statements
such as persons would rather be dead than left "to the mercy of doctors 'and
their machines' ,,.3 The development of rights to refuse treatment has been
one response to these fears. Rights are a major currency of the law. In
contrast, medicine tends to give priority to fulfilling needs. Fulfilling the
needs of persons and respecting their rights can sometimes give rise to a
situation of conflict, in particular, in relation to refusals of treatment with
modem medical technology. Some such situations in which rights have
predominated to allow persons to refuse treatment at the expense of fulfilling
major and serious needs (which they have or are perceived to have) have
been described as "rotting with your rights on". 4 Whatever we may view as
the "correct" approach in such cases, it may be very important to ensure
that "people die with their rights on", if we are to prevent the abuse of over-
use of medical technology and, equally as importantly, the fear of this. Such
fear is harmful in itself and is likely to promote advocacy of euthanasia.
It is also true that developments in medical technology have given rise to
"the secularization of the human image"85 and possibly to a different vision
of human identity. For instance, transplantation may mean that we no
longer each see our self as one, integral whole, but as a collection of inter-
changeable parts, which translates into a modular theory of human iden-
tity." This theory has mechanistic connotations, which may also be linked
82. See, discussion infra, p.51.
83. Fenigsen, supra, note 50, p. 2 4 .
84. T.G. Gutheil, "In Search of True Freedom: Drug Refusal, Involuntary Medication,
and 'Rotting With Your Rights On' ", American Journal of Psychiatry 1980; 137(3):340-346.
85. de Wachter, supra, note 12, p.27, quoting a 1972 pastoral manual of the General
Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church, "Euthanasia: Meaning and Boundaries of Medical
Treatment".
86. M.A. Somerville, "Messages from Three Contemporary Images of Medicine: Failed
Medicine, Miracle Medicine and Science Fiction Medicine", in W.R. Shea and A. Spadafora,
eds., From the Twilight of Probability: Ethics and Politics. (Canton, Massachusetts: Science
History Publications/ U.S.A., 1992), pp.9 1-105.
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to increasing numbers of persons regarding euthanasia as acceptable. We
are, in general, unsentimental about disposing of out-dated, worn out, or no-
longer-efficient machines. If we see ourselves as machines, at least in some
respects, we may apply this same attitude to ourselves and others. Euthana-
sia could be an expression in practice of such an attitude.
(ii) Individual rights
Emphasis on rights of individuals has been a phenomenon of major impor-
tance in many of our western societies, but it may now have peaked, which
one hopes does not mean that it will decline from that peak, although other
concerns also need to be incorporated into our analysis and practice. In
particular, emphasis on the rights of individuals has been essential to ensure
respect for each person, which is crucial in the context of health care, if that
context is to be humane.
Calls for the legalization of euthanasia, have, frequently, been phrased in
terms of respect for individual rights. Most of us recognize a claim to a
death that is respectful of the person - sometimes called a dignified death,
although this term can be misleading - but disagree on what are the limits for
achieving this. In particular, we disagree whether there is a right to this,
because such a right may require actions with which we disagree and a right
of one person necessarily connotes a duty of another, even if only to refrain
from doing anything that would infringe on that right. It is important to
recognize points of consensus when they exist, and then where our disagree-
ment begins. Differences of opinion, especially, regarding such strongly held
beliefs as those concerning euthanasia, can have a very different tone when a
discussion starts from a point of agreement rather than disagreement.
It is tentatively suggested that development of a pro-choice on euthanasia
stance by a society might be a result of a failure to balance a very strong (and
necessary) emphasis on individual rights by any (or at least sufficient) con-
sideration of claims of the community. We need to keep in mind that not
only individuals, but also communities need protection if they are to survive.
Moreover, we can regard a requirement that we protect the community, as
being also for the sake of the individual.87 Hermits aside, most of us need
community in order to develop fully as individuals. An insight into one pos-
sible function of the maintenance of a balance between individual rights and
protection of the community (between individualism and communitarian-
ism) may be provided by comparing this requirement with Young's finding
87. This can be compared with the opposite situation, for instance, originally a primary
purpose of the criminal law in protecting individuals was not to protect the individual as such,
but to maintain the king's fighting men in order to protect the community.
[Vol. 9:1
The Song of Death
of an increase in euthanasia where there was a failure to maintain balance
between religiosity and secularity, movement towards either pole giving such
an increase. 8 If the same were true for emphasis on individual rights as
compared with claims of the community, or vice versa, we could postulate
an increase in euthanasia if the claims of individuals became relatively too
strong in comparison with those of the community, as well as vice versa. It
may well be that the greatest dangers of over-use of euthanasia in the future,
were it to be introduced, would come from over-emphasis on community
claims at the expense of individual rights, which is paradoxical if the intro-
duction of euthanasia is, as is often claimed by its advocates, necessary in
order to respect and promote individual rights.
In light of the above discussion, it is interesting to note that some of the
strongest opposition to anonymous HIV seroprevalence surveys (anonymous
screening of a population to determine the incidence of HIV infection) oc-
curred in The Netherlands, where "opposition to any compulsory public
health measure is so strong that even professional and popular support for
blinded studies is unlikely to overcome the barriers". 89 In contrast, such
surveys have met with general approval in both the United States and Can-
ada and have been carried out after careful consideration of the ethical re-
quirements that need to be fulfilled.9" Could the situation in The
Netherlands in this regard and with respect to euthanasia be related, in that,
both reflect a more or less purely individualistic approach? It is argued in
this text that a purely individualistic approach to euthanasia is more likely to
result in its being seen as justified and acceptable, than when a perspective on
its impact from a more societal point of view is also taken into account.
We all also recognize a right to life of each individual. One question is
whether this means that there is a duty to go on living. It is proposed that
there may be a moral duty to do so, depending on the circumstances, but
there is no legal duty. But to deny such a legal duty, is not the same as
recognizing a claim or right to have death inflicted, that is, euthanasia.9"
Recognition of a right to life also means that, even if one agrees with eutha-
nasia, it would not be allowed to be carried out against the wishes of the
person concerned, that is, involuntary or non-consensual euthanasia would
88. Young, supra, p.16.
89. C. Levine, "AIDS and the Ethics of Human Subjects Research", in F.G. Reamer, ed.,
AIDS and Ethics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 77-104, 83.
90. See, for example, Federal Centre for AIDS (Canada) Working Group on Anonymous
Unlinked HIV Seroprevalence, "Guidelines on ethical and legal considerations in anonymous
unlinked HIV seroprevalence research", Canadian Medical Association Journal 1990;
143(7):625-627.
91. For an argument to the contrary, see, supra, pp. 10-11 and Notes: Harvard Law Re-
view, supra, note 27.
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be prohibited. This raises the issue of avoluntary euthanasia, that is,
whether if euthanasia were allowed, it could be carried out in a situation
where the person is not able to consent or to express wishes and these are not
known. The ethical and legal presumption in favour of life would mean that
persons who had never been competent could not be subject to euthanasia,
unless it were held that the presumption was a rebuttable one and that, in
the particular circumstances, it did not take priority. Allowing euthanasia
for competent persons may or may not set a precedent to the effect that the
presumption in favour of life can be rebutted to allow avoluntary euthanasia.
If, on the one hand, one focuses on the person's right to decide for himself or
herself and uses this as the basis for rebutting the presumption in favour of
life, it would not set such a precedent. If, on the other hand, one focuses on
the fact that permitting euthanasia for competent persons is to recognize
that intentional infliction of death on another is legitimate in certain circum-
stances, for example, to eliminate suffering, this could set a precedent for the
legitimization of avoluntary euthanasia of incompetent persons who are in
similar circumstances to the competent persons who die through euthanasia.
We also need to consider what could be the wider effects of recognizing a
right to die with dignity and holding that this includes a right to have access
to euthanasia. Such a right could be converted to a duty to die with dignity.
This could become a right of society to insist that the person dies "with
dignity" (which is likely to involve involuntary euthanasia in some cases) or
even an obligation to die,92 the corollary of which is a right to kill which
would be implemented through euthanasia. To explore what is implied by
some of the positions contemplated here, one can compare, for example, a
right to treatment with a right to be offered treatment. Rights to treatment
are sometimes proposed as a basis for corresponding duties to impose treat-
ment, which are then converted to rights to impose treatment. The corollary
of a right to be offered treatment, in contrast, is a duty to offer treatment
which the recipient of the offer can accept or refuse.
It is also worth noting in relation to "the language of euthanasia", that the
language of a right to a dignified death is often, although it need not be, used
as a euphemism for euthanasia.
We cannot recognize as rights all the claims of individuals, in particular,
the claims of individuals when viewed as a group or community may conflict
with their claims as individuals. The issue of whether collective claims
should ever be recognized as collective rights and whether these should over-
ride individual rights, will not be pursued here. It is relevant, however, to
92. M.P. Battin, "Age Rationing and the Just Distribution of Health Care: Is there a
Duty to Die?", Ethics 1987; 97(2):317-340.
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the euthanasia discussion, in that, if one accepts that persons have a right to
a dignified death, and if one accepts that this includes a right to euthanasia
and that at an individual level the benefits of recognizing this right outweigh
its harms, nevertheless, the impact at a macro or a societal level of recogniz-
ing such a right, would still need to be considered. It is proposed that at this
level, the harms and risks of such recognition would outweigh any claim of
an individual to have euthanasia made available. Stated another way, we
cannot only consider individual rights, including any right to euthanasia,
from the point of view of the individual, we must also consider the macro or
societal level impact of recognition of such individual rights. The need for
protection of human networks which, at their most macro level, establish the
web which constitutes society, itself, must also be given proper considera-
tion. It is proposed that euthanasia is not acceptable at the societal level,
even if one has no personal moral inhibitions. against it at .the individual level
and that its unacceptability at the societal level outweighs the acceptability
of the best case argument for it at the individual level. The -reasons for my
views in this regard are articulated in various places throughout the remain-
der of this text.
(iii) Sanctity of life and quality of life
There has been a move, in our society, from relying exclusively on a sanc-
tity of life or vitality principle, to relying as well or sometimes alternatively,
on a quality of life principle, which includes concepts of a life not worth
living or even "wrongful life". Initially "wrongful life" was a claim for dam-
ages in tort, usually on the part of handicapped children arguing that in their
cases, life itself, that is, being born constituted a damage for which compen-
sation should be available through the courts. Although in most of these
cases the plaintiffs were not successful, some were.93 There has been a rela-
tively recent case in which the precedent set in these cases has been used at
the other end of life. The plaintiff had refused cardio-pulmonary resuscita-
tion, but was given it after a cardiac arrest and, when resuscitated, was hemi-
plegic. He has sued for damages for "wrongful life.
94
Recognition of a quality of life principle is often linked to euthanasia, in
particular, by the same two opposing groups who argue for a broad defini-
tion of euthanasia - that is, some groups in the pro-life movement and per-
sons who are pro-choice on euthanasia. The former oppose use of the
principle, the latter would give it priority over a sanctity of lifeprinciple.
93. See, for example, Curlender v. Biosciences Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d, 811; 165
Cal. Rpt. 477 (1986), (Ct. App.).
94. D. Margolick, "Patient's Lawsuit Says Saving Life Ruined It", New York Times, 18
March 1990, p.A24.
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But one is not necessarily a proponent of euthanasia or an adversary of a
sanctity of life principle, if one agrees that quality of life is a valid considera-
tion in making decisions concerning treatment at the end of life. Considera-
tion of quality of life is not unjustified, indeed, it may be ethically required in
some circumstances, for example, in making decisions concerning the alloca-
tion of medical resources at a governmental or institutional (macro) level.
The need to consider quality of life arises in part from the possibilities made
available by modern medical technology. It has been well said that once we
were "reasonably well or dead"95 - today we can be very sick for a very long
time at the end of our lives, because life can be prolonged by the use of
modern medical technology. Such circumstances can sometimes raise valid
concerns about the quality of life of the persons whose lives are prolonged.
The reasons for our various approaches to use of a quality of life principle,
as is true of various approaches to euthanasia,96 may be more complex that
we realize at first glance. Campion97 points out that when we describe a
person with Alzheimers disease or Huntington's chorea as "better off dead"
- "not the person he or she used to be" - and by this imply that the person
does not now have a sufficient quality of life, as compared with what he or
she had, to want to go on living (or even to be allowed to go on living), we
need to inquire, what was the person. Persons are always evolving. No one
is what they were previously "and many times ... stopped being the person
[he or] she used to be".98 Does this indicate that it is lack of evolution or a
potential for evolution to what we regard as an acceptable quality of life, that
we perceive as the problem? Is this the basis of one category of statements
related to assessment of quality of life, sometimes made in order to justify
euthanasia, that there is a "loss of dignity" of the patient and, therefore, the
person's life is not worth maintaining or may justifiably be terminated?99
Can we, as humans, not accept either ourselves or someone else simply be-
ing, rather than becoming? Is it, as the novelist Kundera proposes,' 00 a state
of just being, without potential to become something else, that is unbearable?
If this is true, we need to ask, whom would we be treating with euthanasia -
the patient, ourselves or society?
95. J.F. Fries, "Aging, Natural Death, and the Compression of Morbidity", New England
Journal of Medicine 1980; 303(3):130-135.
96. See, supra, p.19-20 and de Hennezel, supra, note 65.
97. B. Campion, "Love and the Quality of Life", [Toronto] The Globe and Mail, 4 August
1990, p.A4.
98. Ibid..
99. If "dignity appears compromised, the argument goes, the patient's life no longer has
the quality that obliges us to preserve it. Indeed, there may even be the obligation to end this
caricature of human existence". (Campion, ibid.).
100. M. Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of Being (New York: Harper & Row, 1984).
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Campion1 proposes that part of the problem when we react inappropri-
ately in relation to ill or dying persons, is that we see an example of a life
that terrifies us. 10 2 We see the patient and ourselves, if we were in the same
situation, as unloveable. This raises fear of abandonment, because in a con-
sumer society we only get what we pay for. We feel that we need to earn
love. If we cannot earn it, we will not be given it. We will die abandoned
and unloved, and we would rather be dead than unloved. Euthanasia is a
way to ensure that we are dead before the abandoning and unloving occurs.
"The demand for active euthanasia would be greatly reduced if we could
alter this perception that love is very tenuous, that it is conditional and must
be deserved".
10 3
The possible connection of euthanasia with a mechanistic approach to per-
sons has been mentioned already. Such an approach is also related to a con-
sumer society. It is characteristic of this type of society that it disposes of
worn-out or useless products. This becomes mandatory when these products
result in a nett overall economic loss. If we see ourselves simply as products
or cogs in the wheel of production of a consumer society, then, once we are
no longer valuable products or producers, according to the dictates of a
strict consumer philosophy we would need to be disposed off as cheaply and
efficiently as possible. Although euthanasia is promoted as a merciful re-
sponse and most of those who advocate it have this as a primary aim, it does
fit within this consumer philosophy. Further, the practice of euthanasia, it-
self, could be seen as consistent with the philosophy of a consumer society,
because it means that "death becomes a matter of management"." This in
turn means that in carrying out euthanasia "a number of choices become
necessary and several practical points must be discussed: the day and the
hour of euthanasia, those to be present, the method to be used". 0 5 The
bizarre thought comes to mind that, in the future, persons studying for
master's degrees in business management, could have the possibility of tak-
ing a course in "death administration".
The argument that euthanasia being seen as acceptable by increasing num-
bers of persons in a society is connected with that society being influenced
(or more precisely dominated) by a consumer philosophy, becomes particu-
larly convincing, it is proposed, if we consider the circumstances of many
101. Supra, note 97.
102. It is interesting to compare the trigger for this terror reaction - a fear of a certain kind
of life - with the trigger for the other terror reaction -intense fear of death - which is also
arguably relevant to euthanasia. See, supra, pp. 17-19 and the work of Greenberg et al., supra,
note 57.
103. Ibid.. See, also, supra, pp.20-21, and de Henezel, supra, note 65.
104. See, de Wachter, supra, note 12, p. 25, referring to Cohen.
105. Ibid..
19931
30 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 9:1
persons with AIDS. Katz powerfully describes the situation in which termi-
nally ill persons can find themselves, as one of intense "pre-mortem loneli-
ness". 10 6 In this respect it is of sad interest to note that in 1989 it was
reported that "11.2% of Dutch AIDS patients died by active euthanasia".'o 7
In 1991, one report put this figure at 23%. 108 But in either case, these statis-
tics seem to be well above the average number of deaths that occur through
euthanasia in The Netherlands.'0 9 If we consider who are the most stigma-
tized, most-likely-to-be abandoned, dying persons in our societies, almost
certainly they are persons with AIDS. Without minimizing or ignoring the
intense physical and mental suffering that AIDS can cause, these other fea-
tures of their dying may well correlate with an increased likelihood that per-
sons with AIDS will seek euthanasia (or be offered it), especially in a society
that is governed by a consumer ideology. In such a society persons with
AIDS may be viewed, not only as useless products, but also as potentially
harmful ones. Moreover isolating persons with AIDS from society, whether
106. J. Katz, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient (New York: Free Press, 1986), 207 if..
107. Fenigsen, supra, note 50, p.2 2.
108. T.W. Gremmem and F.M. Van der Boom, "AIDS, Euthanasia and Grief", Paper
presented at First International Conference on Biopsychosocial Aspects of HIV Infection,
Amsterdam, 22-25 September, 1991, Final Program and Abstract Book, p.203. See, also, J.
Beckett, et al., "Physician Attitudes Towards Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia", ibid., p.20 2.
109. It is very difficult to find non-disputed statistics on the number and percentage of
deaths occurring through euthanasia in The Netherlands. Figures are given, but "[tihe extent
• .is not known. According to a recent report, there were some 200-300 cases of euthanasia
in Amsterdam in 1987, 10 percent of which were reported to the public prosecutor. The fre-
quently cited figure is 5000-8000 cases per year but the Amsterdam data suggests this figure is
too high. According to one estimate, the average general physician has recourse to euthanasia
once every three years". (Rigter, supra, note 10, p.32). Reasons for this difficulty include non-
reporting (Rigter, p.31) and possibly under-exaggeration or over-exaggeration of "soft" data in
order to promote a position either for or against euthanasia. It seems that exaggeration in
either direction can occur with respect to both positions, that is, that "for" or that "against"
euthanasia. For example, it can be argued by those opposing euthanasia, that so few people
need euthanasia that society is not justified in legalizing it; alternatively, it can be argued that
the number of cases that have occurred or will occur is so large that euthanasia should not be
legalized because this indicates a great potential for wide abuse. Similarly, pro-euthanasia
advocates argue that the numbers are so small that abuse is very unlikely; or that the numbers
are or will be so large that this demonstrates a major societal need for euthanasia and for
approval of it. A recent report (van der Mass, van Delden, Pijnenborg, and Looman, supra,
note 11) presents the results of three nationwide studies in The Netherlands on euthanasia and
other medical decisions concerning the end of life, undertaken for the Dutch Remmelink Com-
mission. (This report has elicited further discussion. See, for example, Hastings Center Report,
Vol.22, March-April 1992, which features articles on euthanasia, including, in The Nether-
lands.) But even this report does not resolve some important uncertainties since its "findings
require cautious interpretation, because there are no universally accepted definitions of such
terms as 'euthanasia' and 'killing', and what is 'euthanasia' for one person is but 'good medical
practice' or the withholding of 'futile treatment' for another". (H. Kuhse and P. Singer,
"From the Editors", Bioethics 1992; 6(4):iii-vi, v.)
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in practice or symbolically - including through euthanasia of persons with
AIDS having these effects - may serve a further function for the society, that
of a purification ritual. It could be that use of euthanasia in the context of
AIDS, is an example of euthanasia functioning as a purification ritual, which
it should be recognized it has the capacity to do. Calls, often strident, to test
everyone in general for HIV and quarantine those who are antibody positive,
or to exclude them from schools, hospitals or the workplace - including
practice in the health care professions -can originate from a desire, even if
unconscious, for acts that will serve a function of symbolic purification of
the group or society and affirm that this purity exists. Could euthanasia be
the ultimate example of this type of ritualistic phenomenon?" 0
It also merits considering whether the language we have used in relation
to AIDS could have an impact on our views and reactions to euthanasia in
the context of AIDS. Military terminology, especially, the concept of a war
on AIDS, is frequently encountered. Could there be some connection, even
if an unconscious one, between this language and views that the use of eutha-
nasia is acceptable in relation to persons with AIDS? Could the use of eu-
thanasia in AIDS even be some form of killing of the enemy, in that one of
us, and not HIV, is mistakenly seen as the enemy?
IV. WHY Do WE WNAT TO MEDICALIZE EUTHANASIA?
Does euthanasia seem kinder, gentler and in a "safer forum" if it is carried
out in a clinical context?.. Does this show both "approval, acceptance and
care of the patient"1" 2 and of his or her decision for euthanasia? In speaking
of physician assisted suicide, it has been said that "[s]eeking a physician's
assistance, or what can almost seem a physician's blessing, may be a way of
trying to remove ... stigma and show others that the decision for suicide
was made with due seriousness and was justified under the circumstances.
The physician's involvement provides a kind of social approval, or more ac-
curately helps counter what would otherwise be unwarranted social disap-
proval".' Could euthanasia provide a precedent for some other
110. For a discussion of attitudes and behaviour in relation to HIV/AIDS and persons
with AIDS, which serve functions other than their apparent or proclaimed practical aims, for
instance, symbolic and ritual functions, see, M.A. Somerville, "Law as an 'Art Form' Reflect-
ing AIDS: A Challenge to the Province and Function of Law", in James Miller, ed., Fluid
Exchanges: Artists and Critics in the AIDS Crisis (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1992), 287-304.
111. See, M.A. Somerville, "Human Rights and Medicine: The Relief of Suffering", in
Irwin Cotder and F. Pearl Eliadis, eds., International Human Rights Law: Theory and Prac-
tice, (Montreal, Quebec: The Canadian Human Rights Foundation, 1992), 505-522.
112. Campion, supra, note 97.
113. Brock, supra, note 25, p. 2 1 .
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interventions which will, also, be carried out "in the medical context",
which have important, potentially dangerous, societal impact? For example,
in the United States, physicians' involvement in carrying out capital punish-
ment, is a case in point. Such interventions can be given trial runs or at-
tempts made to make them acceptable through their utilization in a clinical
or purportedly clinical context, before their much more controversial appli-
cation outside such a context. These questions may seem alarmist, but they
are ones which we need to ask and with a certain degree of equanimity.
We should keep in mind that it is not uncommon to medicalize situations
in order to deal with these situations in ways in which we would not feel
comfortable or even that would be prohibited outside a medical situation.
For example, infringement of even constitutionally protected rights to lib-
erty and security of the person can be justified pursuant to powers given
under mental health acts or public health legislation, which allow interven-
tions necessary to protect either the persons themselves or others from seri-
ous threats to their lives or health. We need to be careful in adopting tactics
and devices such as medicalization, that we do not dull our sensitivity to
some of the basic issues involved. It has been said that nowhere are human
rights more threatened than when we act purporting to do good to others.
There is a presumption that when we act within a medical context, we at
least have a primary intention of doing good. This presumption would apply
equally to euthanasia, as to other interventions in a medical context. Conse-
quently, although it is usually argued that euthanasia is most appropriately
provided within a medical context and it is often argued that to allow eutha-
nasia is to promote human rights, this claim would be more clearly tested by
dealing with euthanasia outside the medical context rather than within it. 14
Some proposed legislation for Canada 15 mentioned previously, which has
now been withdrawn, is of note in this respect, in that, it would have re-
quired euthanasia to be dealt with in part outside a medical context. This
legislation, possibly uniquely, proposed that there should be "referees in eu-
114. See, Somerville, supra, note 11. See, also, M.P. Battin, "Assisted Suicide: Can We
Learn from Germany?", Hastings Center Report 1992; 22(2):44. Battin describes the situation
in Germany, in which assisted suicide in terminal illness seems to be regarded as de facto
acceptable in certain circumstances provided it is carried out entirely outside the medical con-
text. Such assistance within the latter context, in particular by physicians, is regarded as en-
tirely unacceptable. This can be contrasted with the situation in The Netherlands, where
assistance in euthanasia is only regarded as acceptable if provided by a physician. See also, A.
Tuffs, "Germany: Scandal over euthanasia", The Lancet 1993;i:551, in which it is reported
that "[u]nder cover of humane euthanasia a network of couriers has been selling cyanide cap-
sules for years and making a fortune out of it".
115. Supra, note 47.
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thanasia" ' 6 for Canada, who would issue "euthanasia certificates"' 17 which
would permit a physician to carry out euthanasia on the person to whom the
certificate had been issued.' 18 There was no suggestion that the "referees in
euthanasia" should be physicians. Indeed, under the proposed legislation
application could be made for review of a negative decision of a "referee in
euthanasia", by the Attorney General of Canada who is unlikely to be a
physician.
In summary, we must enquire whether we may at least in part be dealing
with euthanasia in a medical context in order to eliminate or reduce reac-
tions that we would otherwise have to one person killing another. Moreover,
to the extent that we expect modern medicine to be our source of miracles,
could it be that when no miracles are possible, death is a miracle substitute
or even a different kind of "miracle", but one still provided by medicine if it
occurs through euthanasia carried out by a physician?
V. WHY Do WE TECHNOLOGIZE EUTHANASIA?
We need to ask, for example, in the much publicized case of Dr. Kevor-
kian assisting Mrs. Janet Adkin's death, why did Dr. Kevorkian and Mrs.
Adkins, resort to a suicide machine which was even given a special, trade-
marked name, the Thanatron&? 19 One obvious reason is in order to try to
avoid prosecution for murder by eliminating the possibility that Dr. Kevor-
kian could be held, in law, to have caused Mrs. Adkins' death. Through use
of the machine, Mrs. Adkins could be regarded, in law, as causing her own
death, in which case the situation was one of suicide - and if anything, assist-
ance in suicide on the part of Dr. Kevorkian, which was not at that time a
crime in Michigan120 - not murder. It is worth noting, however, that even in
the case of Mrs. Adkins, where Dr. Kevorkian did not intervene after the
initial intravenous lines had been inserted and Mrs. Adkins herself activated
administration of the lethal drugs, a charge of murder was considered. In
two subsequent cases, Dr. Kevorkian did intervene, in one instance to rem-
edy a defect in the machine after it had been started. With respect to these




119. A. Hister, "Kevorkian Offers Cold Comfort on Euthanasia Debate", [Toronto] The
Globe and Mail, 14 September 1991, p.C8.
120. Since these events, legislation has been passed in Michigan making it a crime to assist
a person to commit suicide. Act 84, Public Acts of 1992, 1992 Mi. ALS 84; 1992 Mi. P.A. 84;
1992 Mi. HB5501.
121. Reuters News Agency, "Doctor Charged with Murder in Assisted Suicide", [Toronto]
The Globe and Mail, 6 February 1992, p.A9.
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There may, however, be a less obvious reason why we technologize eutha-
nasia. We often speak of the technological imperative in medicine, that is,
that we have technology and, therefore, think or feel that we must use it.
The presence of technology elicits a response to use it and much discussion
in bioethics has been concerned with attempting to work out principles and
guidelines for when we ought (there is a duty), not ought (there is no duty),
or ought not (there is a duty not) to use technology. Could the case of eu-
thanasia be a variation on this technological imperative response? Could it
be that in euthanasia cases, such as those involving Dr. Kevorkian, that
rather than the technology preceding and eliciting a certain response, a cer-
tain response - namely, euthanasia - is desired and recognition of this pre-
cedes and elicits the technology which will generate the desired response?
Does the use of technology somehow come between us and the person to
whom we apply the technology,1 23 such that we do not feel that it is our act
that creates the result - in the case of euthanasia, death of the person - but
rather, that this is caused by the technology? Does the use of technology
allow us to distance ourselves, to dis-identify in some degree, from the fact
that we are killing another person in the act of euthanasia?
It has been alleged that when we apply technology to other persons in the
medical context, there is a risk that we de-personalize the others and see
them simply as the objects for the application of our technology. Further,
we find it easier to act towards others in ways about which we have deep
concerns, when we do not regard those affected by our acts as persons simi-
lar to ourselves. For example, researchers found it very much more difficult
and sometimes impossible to carry out certain medical research on persons,
when they were forced to relate personally to the potential subjects through
themselves participating in a detailed informed consent process.124 Could
this provide insights into why persons would develop technology to carry
out euthanasia? In summary, technology allows us to distance ourselves
122. M. Betzold, "Cleared 'suicide doctor' urges other physicians to join him", [Montreal]
The Gazette, 22 July 1992, p.B5. Editorial, "Who has the final choice?", [Montreal] The Ga-
zette, 28 July 1992, p.B2.
123. It is of interest that the way in which I wrote this sentence, initially, was "Does the
use of technology somehow come between us and the person to whom the technology is ap-
plied...", as though there was not necessarily a human agent involved in applying the tech-
nology. This, in itself, would seem to demonstrate the point I am making here, that the use of
technology (or even just contemplation of its use) causes or at least allows us to depersonalize
situations in which it is employed.
124. J.J. Lally, B. Barber, "The Compassionate Physician: Frequency and Social Determi-
nants of Physician-Investigator Concern for Human Subjects", Social Forces 1974; 53(2):289-
96.
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from others on whom we act and to depersonalize them, and, unless we do
this, it may be very much more difficult to kill the other person. As an aside,
it is also worth noting here that we can use language to achieve similar ef-
fects. The choice of certain language facilitates our distancing ourselves
from others and depersonalizing them. One example of this is the use of
derogatory terms for those killed as the enemy in wartime. A more everyday
example is the failure to use the word person when describing an individual
or a group, which almost always occurs in relation to derogatory characteri-
zations, for example, criminals, delinquents, mental incompetents (in com-
parison, we do not speak of mental competents, but rather of mentally
competent persons) and the aged.
In summary, as Annas says: "Machines have a tendency to depersonalize
death and to make us seem less responsible for it .... The use of military
metaphors in medicine tends to obliterate the patient, just as the use of medi-
cal metaphors by the military tends to obliterate the horrors of war. In both
cases, we prefer to concentrate on the technology because, unlike death, it
seems clean and controllable."' 25
VI. WHY WOULD EUTHANASIA BE ALLOWED OR NOT PROSECUTED,
BUT NOT LEGALIZED?
The criminal law of, all countries prohibits culpable homicide - murder
and manslaughter. Euthanasia is prohibited pursuant to such laws. A ma-
jority of countries also prohibit assisting suicide, although in modem crimi-
nal law suicide itself is often not a crime. There are also examples, of which
The Netherlands is the main one, of countries which allow euthanasia under
certain conditions, but have not legalized it at least in a strict legal sense.' 26
The criminal law of The Netherlands, the Penal Code, prohibits murder
(euthanasia) in section 293 and prohibits assistance in suicide in section 294.
125. G.J. Annas, "Killing Machines", Hastings Center Report 1991; 21:33,35.
126. It seems that this situation will be maintained even after legislative approval of
"Netherlands Reporting Procedure for Euthanasia", supra, note 13. A press release (dated
February 1993) provided by the Embassy of the Netherlands, Ottawa, Canada, states that
"[e]uthanasia is a crime under Dutch Criminal Law" and that the 1990 guidelines "on the
reporting procedure for euthanasia... have now been codified". In short, the existing situa-
tion has been legislatively recognized, but not changed, except to the degree that such recogni-
tion, itself, constitutes change. For analysis of the operation and ,effect in law of the guidelines,
which while undertaken prior to codification of the guidelines remains valid, see H.J.J. Leenen,
supra, note 74; Diana Brahams, "Euthanasia in the Netherlands", The Lancet, 1990; i:591-
592; H.D.C. Roscam Abbing, "Dying with Dignity, and Euthanasia: A View from The
Netherlands", Journal of Palliative Care ("Special Issue on AIDS") 1988; 4:70-75, 71; Rigter,
supra, note 10; de Wachter, supra, note 12; Capron, supra, note 11; H.A. ten Have and J.V.M.
Welie, "Euthanasia: Normal Medical Practice?", Hastings Center Report 1992; 22(2):34.
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In The Netherlands, however, prosecution is unlikely127 if certain guidelines
are respected and, in any case, decisions to prosecute must be approved by
five senior prosecutors.' 2  The jurisprudential basis used to validate these
guidelines are a few articles in the Dutch Penal Code "listing possible
grounds for non-punishment" for an offence.' 29 The conditions for legiti-
mizing a given act of euthanasia are, "among other things, that there be an
explicit and repeated request by the patient that leaves no reason for doubt
concerning his desire to die; that the mental or physical suffering of the pa-
tient must be very severe with no prospect of relief; that the patient's deci-
sion be well-informed, free, and enduring; that all options for other care have
been exhausted or refused by the patient; and that the doctor consult another
physician (in addition, he may decide to consult nurses, pastors, and
others)".' It is reported that there has even been a case of a physician
being disciplined by a Dutch Medical Disciplinary Board for "breach of
trust" for "misleading a patient into supposing he was being given a lethal
dose of drugs, when the doctor knew this was not so".131 "[T]he doctor was
in effect found guilty for 'not ... unlawfully killing his patient'."'' 32 There is
also in the Dutch context an intense debate over whether euthanasia should
be available where the person concerned is incompetent to consent. As al-
ready noted, 3 3 some and probably a substantial number of such cases of
euthanasia occur, although they would clearly seem to be outside the guide-
lines. These cases include, not only incompetent adults, but also handi-
capped newborn babies. 1
34
What insights does the Dutch approach to euthanasia provide? First, it is
127. Leenen, ibid.; Brahams, ibid.. It would seem that prosecution, while unlikely, is still
possible, even if the guidelines are followed, that is, euthanasia remains punishable and
whether the physician has a defence is "assessed by the prosecution and the judge"
(Leenen, p.9). However, see, P.A. Singer and M. Siegler, "Euthanasia - A Critique", New
England Journal of Medicine 1990; 322(26):1881-3, who seem to imply the contrary. See, also,
Rigter who states that "... . the present government has not adopted a long-standing proposal
to legalize euthanasia. Instead, it has decided that physicians who terminate life on request of
the patient will not be punished only if they invoke a defense of force majeure and have satis-
fied ... [certain] criteria... and then only on condition that the court accepts this defense.
Such possible immunity from prosecution applies only to doctors". (Ibid., p. 3 1.) This ap-
proach will be codified, if the proposed legislation (supra, note 13, and ibid.) is fully ratified.
128. Brahams, supra, note 126, p. 59 2.
129. ten Have and Welie, supra, note 126, p. 36.
130. Rigter, supra, note 10, p. 3 1.
131. Brahams, supra, note 126, p. 59 1.
132. Ibid, quoting B. Levin "Under patient's orders to kill", [London] Times, 11 December
1989.
133. Supra, p.5.
134. Associated Press, "Mercy killing for newborns spurs euthanasia debate", [Montreal]
The Gazette, 30 July 1992, p.A6.
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important to recognize that, unless the codification of the guidelines on the
procedure for reporting euthanasia is interpreted as changing the previous
situation, which does not seem to be intended or likely, the law has not been
changed to legalize euthanasia. Rather, individual cases are justified (query,
excused' 35) in situations of "ifforce majeure, in the sense of conflicting du-
ties".' 36 The commentary on the Dutch law with respect to what constitutes
this defence is not always easy to understand or consistent, which may re-
flect some lack of clarity as to either the exact characteristics of the defence
itself or its application in practice. For example, Brahams states that "force
majeure" in the sense of irresistible force has been rejected as a defence to
euthanasia.' 37 She equates the defence of irresistible force to a defence of
necessity and, therefore, likewise, also finds this defence rejected. 3 ' Rather,
Brahams states, a "conflicting duties situation", which she describes as "the
emergency defence", is recognized by Dutch courts: "The court ruled that a
physician's duty to abide by the law and to respect the life of his patient
'may be outweighed by his other duty to help a patient who is suffering
unbearably, who depends upon him and for whom, to end his suffering, there
is no alternative but death' ". 139 In contrast, Keown' 4° says that the defence
available to Dutch physicians to justify euthanasia is one of necessity
("overmacht") contained in Article 40 of the Dutch Penal Code. He says
that in a 1986 case the Dutch Supreme Court "accepted that the defense of
necessity in the sense of 'psychological compulsion' experienced by the doc-
tor was also available".14 1 In any case, it can be queried whether there is
any equivalent to such a "conflicting duties" defence in anglo-american com-
mon law. The only possibility would seem to be a defence of necessity. A
defence of necessity is available in anglo-american common law when the
harm done by breaking the law is clearly outweighed by the harm avoided in
doing so; the harm avoided is of a serious nature; there is no reasonable
alternative to breaking the law, if the harm is to be avoided; and the least
harmful approach that will avoid the harm is used. The critical issue regard-
ing possible use of a defence of necessity in relation to euthanasia is whether
the harm done by breaking the law - killing a person - could ever be out-
135. See, M.A. Somerville, supra, note 38, for discussion of the difference between justifica-
tions and excuses. The former renders the conduct in question legally acceptable, the latter
does not, but excuses the actor from liability for it.
136. Leenen, supra, note 76, p.5.
137. Brahams, supra, note 126, p.592.
138. Ibid..
139. Ibid., citing B. Sluyters, "Euthanasia in The Netherlands", Medico-Legal Journal
1989; 57:34-43.
140. J. Keown, "On Regulating Death", Hastings Center Report 1992; 22(2):39.
141. Ibid., p.41.
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weighed by the harm avoided by doing so - relief of suffering. This seems
highly unlikely because it is only if the necessity in question is to save a
human life, that killing can be excused, although not justified, under a com-
mon law doctrine of necessity.'4 2 Further, leaving aside the morality of eu-
thanasia, the harm done at a precedent-setting and societal level in allowing
euthanasia, would not, in my view, be outweighed by harm avoided at the
individual level.
One query that can be raised is whether in establishing this system of
legitimation of euthanasia, the Dutch have managed to maintain at least an
impression that each case of euthanasia constitutes only an individual event,
not only in practice, but also symbolically, despite the fact that the total
number of cases of euthanasia in The Netherlands is probably very large.'43
The features of the approach taken in The Netherlands could help to achieve
such an outcome, namely, that each case of euthanasia must be justified indi-
vidually and reported;'" each case, technically, is prima facie a breach of
the law; and in each case, there is the potential for the conduct to be found
not justified and prosecuted. This approach may generate more of a sense of
individuality and less one of institutionalization of euthanasia, than there
would be if euthanasia were generally legalized, but only on certain condi-
tions. Why, however, would the Dutch adopt this approach if euthanasia is
regarded as acceptable by the public, in general? One reason might be that
such an approach helps to keep cases of euthanasia confined to the micro
level and as exceptions to a general principle or presumption against the
taking of human life, the latter of which can still then operate at the macro
or societal level. To the contrary, were euthanasia to be legalized directly by
the legislature, rather than indirectly as is currently and will remain the case,
the level of impact of euthanasia would certainly include major impact at the
macro level and the general principle or presumption that governs in the
society would be changed to one that life may be taken in certain
circumstances.
In short, the current approach in The Netherlands may maintain a certain
symbolism of upholding the principle of the sanctity of life, while allowing
practices that are inconsistent with this. This same mechanism can be seen
142. de Wachter, supra, note 12, p.27, quoting B. Dickens. See also, Somerville, supra,
note 38.
143. See, supra, note 109.
144. Recent studies, show, however, widespread non-compliance with reporting provisions.
See, ten Have and Welie, supra note 126; and Keown, supra, note 140, p.40, who says that in
fewer than 2% of the cases of euthanasia, in The Netherlands, was the prosecutor notified.
The new "Reporting Procedure" guidelines (supra, notes 13, 126) are aimed at remedying this
situation. If they do, they might make euthanasia less, rather than more, available, despite its
having been "recognized" by the Dutch Parliament, which can be seen as a paradoxical result.
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operating in the French legal and medical systems. A report entitled
"French Health Ministry Supports Doctor Over Euthanasia", reads as
follows:
Leon Schwartzenberg, an eminent French Cancer Specialist, has
been suspended for one year by the Paris board of the French Med-
ical Association. The suspension follows Schwartzenberg's admis-
sion that he had helped an incurable patient to die. Claude Evin,
the French Health Minister, has now joined Schwartzenberg in fil-
ing an appeal, and in calling for broad public debate on euthanasia.
Evin said: "The main thing is to relieve suffering, even if that
means the end of life." Neither Evin nor Schwartzenberg favour a
change in legislation, however. Schwartzenberg has said: "for the
French, anything that is law is normal, and euthanasia can never be
normal."
' 14 5
A similar approach of defacto, but not dejure, legalization of euthanasia,
has recently been advocated for Canada. The proposal of Sneiderman, a law
professor, who does not oppose euthanasia, is summarized in the headline
accompanying an article written by him: "Don't make it murder, but don't
make it legal".' 46 Sneiderman writes that "[i]n the rare situation in which
the physician is driven to desperate measures (as [occurred recently] in a
Montreal case [in which a physician gave a lethal injection of potassium
chloride to a terminally ill person with AIDS who was suffering greatly]),
the law has the capacity to stay its hand as a merciful response to a merciful
act. But that is a far cry from granting physicians the legal authority to
practice euthanasia. As philosopher John Rawls says, 'It is one thing to
justify an act; it is another to justify a general practice'. Given the current
crisis over a health-care system unable to meet the reasonable needs of all
our ailing people, we cannot guarantee that euthanasia would be practised
solely as the medical measure of last resort. In short, one cannot say that the
time for euthanasia has come to Canada."'
147
In summary, even those who do or would allow euthanasia at an individ-
ual level, recognize the danger of this at the societal level. An important
issue, therefore, is whether it is possible to prevent approved micro level
practices from establishing macro level precedent. Almost certainly, it is
not. Consequently, quite apart from moral arguments, it is proposed that
euthanasia should not be allowed at the micro level because of the macro
level effect of this.
145. New Scientist, 28 July 1990, 22 (emphasis added).
146. B. Sneiderman, [Toronto] The Globe and Mail, 17 August 1992, p.A19.
147. Ibid..
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VII. HIDDEN DECISION-MAKING AND EUTHANASIA
It is often alleged that much euthanasia takes place in our society, but that
it is performed secretly and the fact that it occurs is hidden. It is further
alleged that this situation is the result of euthanasia being illegal. Recent
studies, however, show much hidden (at least in the sense of unreported)
euthanasia in The Netherlands, '4 8 where euthanasia is de facto legal. Conse-
quently, the cause of euthanasia's being hidden may not only (or even not at
all, because even if legal it may still be hidden) be the result of its being
illegal. We usually react strongly in modern, western societies, against hid-
den decision-making and actions, but should we always do so? To respond
to this question requires that some distinctions be made. Do we believe that
hidden decision-making, itself, is wrong and in all or just some circum-
stances, or do we rather believe that most cases of such decision-making
involve unethical or illegal decisions, that these need to be prevented and
this can best be achieved by eschewing hidden decision-making? We need to
be open-minded enough to ask whether there is a place for hidden decision-
making and actions by individuals, although not by institutions or society, in
some very unusual situations. We need also to ask whether, beyond taking
certain steps, trying to eliminate all hidden decision-making regarding eu-
thanasia would do more harm than good. In particular, we need to ask
whether legalizing euthanasia, in order to try to avoid hidden decision-mak-
ing, would do more harm than good even if we were to achieve the aim of
eliminating hidden decision-making concerning euthanasia.
We can compare euthanasia with abortion regarding possible effects of
hidden decision-making. Whether or not one agrees that abortion is morally
accepiable, abortion is an example where creating circumstances which give
rise to its being carried out in a hidden manner, causes a major increase in
serious risk for women who have abortions, and may not deter women from
having abortions. This is one argument against using law to prohibit abor-
tion in the early stages of pregnancy. Another argument is that the law is
ineffective to prevent abortion, especially in light of the availability of new
methods of abortion, in particular, the "abortion pill", which do not require
the use of sophisticated medical techniques or facilities.
But to accept that certain law prohibiting abortion may create unaccept-
able levels of harm without compensating benefits, in particular, protecting
fetuses from abortion, or is totally ineffective, does not address or alter the
morality of abortion. Rather, no matter whether the law allows or prohibits
148. See, Keown, supra, note 140, p.40 citing C.F. Gomez, "Regulating Death: Euthana-
sia and the Case of The Netherlands", (New York, The Free Press, 1991) who states that in
less than 2% of cases of euthanasia was the prosecutor notified.
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abortion, those who believe abortion is immoral must try to convince those
who do not believe this and persuade them to alter their conduct
accordingly.
Causing euthanasia to be carried out in a hidden manner because it is
illegal, is not likely to give rise to similar risks and harms to the person
subject to it. At least, this is true, first, if one does not regard not being killed
when one desires this as a harm. (Hidden euthanasia is, almost certainly, far
less readily available than legalized euthanasia would be and some persons
who would have access under an overt, legalized system of euthanasia, may
not have access in the absence of such a system.) And, second, this is true
provided hidden euthanasia only involves persons who want to be killed and
would be eligible for euthanasia if it were legalized, since these persons
would also be killed if euthanasia were overt and legal. Some persons argue,
however, that the potential for abuse is vastly increased by forcing acts of
euthanasia to be hidden, which occurs when it is prohibited by law. But it
could also be that the potential for abuse is increased more when euthanasia
is legalized than when it is not. For instance, Dutch public policy allowing
euthanasia has been criticized "for creating a 'private place' for euthanasia
which is both spacious and poorly policed". 149 Further, it is not uncommon
for those in favour of euthanasia to demand that opponents of voluntary
euthanasia provide data or evidence of a "slippery slope" in order to justify
continuing to prohibit it. 150 But this is the opposite burden of proof from
that which one would usually expect. Normally, those who wish to change
the "status quo", that is, to legalize euthanasia, would be required to show
leaving aside for the moment questions regarding the morality of euthanasia
that the change in the law is not dangerous to individuals or society or at
least no more dangerous than the present situation, and possibly that the
proposed change will do more good than harm.
It should be noted that recognizing that euthanasia may occur in a hidden
manner and deciding that to take all possible measures to try to prevent
these instances, even though they are in serious breach of the law, would
cause more harm than good, does not mean that, therefore, one finds eutha-
nasia morally acceptable. Moreover, if such hidden instances become
known, they would need to be prosecuted, if the general effectiveness and
symbolism of the law prohibiting euthanasia is to be maintained. It is simply
noted here that there is always a discretion whether to prosecute and, in
some rare cases involving euthanasia this discretion may be best exercised by
149. Keown, supra, note 140, p.40, quoting C.F. Gomez, Regulating Death: Euthanasia
and the Case of The Netherlands (New York, The Free Press, 1991).
150. For example, Brock, supra note 25, p.20
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deciding not to prosecute. Such cases, however, should be clearly excep-
tional, if they are not to become a message, in particular, to health care
professionals, that they can carry out euthanasia with impunity. Likewise,
suspended or light sentences for euthanasia can have the same effect. In
handing down such a sentence very recently, a Canadian court expressly
noted that health care professionals should not interpret it in this way. 5'
One needs to take great care with some current research on attitudes to
euthanasia, that involves surveys that abandon the distinction between eu-
thanasia, as defined in this text, and other interventions or non-interventions
at the end of life. Such surveys often promote the idea that there is much
hidden euthanasia, in that, many health care professionals - physicians and
nurses - have carried out euthanasia for a long time. There is at least an
implication, and sometimes articulation of an argument, that this provides
evidence that the law should be brought into line with such practice on the
grounds that this conduct has "obviously" not caused any harm; that it must
be necessary; that the persons who have undertaken these interventions are
of "good conscience" and good-will; and that these persons have neither
been sought out nor prosecuted. 152 For example, there has been a recent
report from Boston that one in five United States physicians has deliberately
caused a patient's death. The report, however, speaks of terminally-ill pa-
tients who asked for assistance in committing suicide and it is not clear
what, if any, were the limits to the conduct engaged in by the physicians in
order to "help death".
1 53
In interpreting such surveys, first, a much more accurate assessment
would need to be done of exactly what the physicians surveyed meant by
"helping death". For example, respecting refusals of treatment or giving
necessary pain relief treatment, even if this could shorten life, might have
been included. It needs to be acknowledged that there are major legal differ-
ences and it is proposed major ethical differences between these kinds of
assistance and, for instance, giving a person a lethal injection, and that this is
true whether or not one agrees with euthanasia.
Second, even if some physicians are carrying out practices about which we
disagree with respect to their ethical acceptability and which are legally un-
acceptable, this does not mean that the law should be changed to legitimize
151. C. Mungan & G. Abbate, "Sentence suspended in euthanasia case", [Toronto] The
Globe and Mail, 25 August 1992, p.A1. But see also, Canadian Press, "Euthanasia: M.D. gets
suspended sentence," [Montreal] The Gazette, 4 April 1993, p.A1, a later case in which the
judge gave a similar sentence without any such caveat.
152. "Nurses Admit Helping Eighty Die", [Adelaide, Australia] supra, note 26.
153. As reported in "One in Five Doctors Helps Death", Weekend Australian, 29 Febru-
ary, 1 March 1992, p. 13 .
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such practices. Neither, however, as discussed above, does it mean that in
all cases the law should be relentlessly used to prosecute them. It may be
that in some very unusual circumstances, at the level of an individual case,
prosecution is inappropriate. At the same time, the symbolism that is cre-
ated by the law prohibiting the conduct concerned, is required at the macro
level and great care must be taken not to damage this in dealing with such
cases.
It is also argued that, because euthanasia is illegal, persons who carry out
euthanasia are fearful of prosecution and that they should not have to be
subject to this fear. There are, however, arguments to the contrary. First,
such immensely serious decisions as euthanasia should never be easy. That
such a decision is difficult, at both cognitive and emotional levels, for the
person who will carry it out, is an essential and enormously important safe-
guard. Second, even for those persons who feel morally justified in perform-
ing euthanasia, it can be argued that there is some validity, and a safeguard,
in the fact that they must at least consider the views of society as expressed
in its law and be prepared to take the consequences of not conforming with
this. This may seem a very "hard-hearted" approach and it may be thought
to come from a failure to appreciate the anguish that can arise in some indi-
vidual cases for persons who believe that in those particular cases the availa-
bility of euthanasia is not only morally acceptable, but morally required.
This is not the case. Rather, it is proposed, euthanasia is a situation in
which individual "hard" cases would make very "bad" law for society as a
whole, if the law were changed to legalize euthanasia.
Leaving aside, for the moment, questions of the morality of euthanasia, in
short, we may sometimes have to choose between the law that we need for
symbolism - the law that would be best for establishing principles at the
macro level - and what would be the "best" approach, in the sense of most
compassionate and merciful, in some very difficult individual cases. This, in
my view, is one of the situations where the needs of the community - the
society - must take priority over claims of the individual. We cannot afford
to routinize and institutionalize, let alone legalize, killing. Such routiniza-
tion and institutionalization can be avoided, even if some very rare cases in
which a physician intentionally kills a patient are not prosecuted, provided
that the cases involved are each regarded as individual instances, and as
outside the norm and, in particular, are not regarded as a group of cases
which as a collective establish the norm. In short, it is simply wrong to
argue, as some do, that because prohibited conduct, such as euthanasia, may
be or even is occurring, this in itself provides justification for legalizing it.
Our most ancient laws, prescriptions and proscriptions are against killing
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at least members of our own species. There have, it is true, always been
exceptions to this rule, which needed to be restrictively interpreted and their
use clearly justified by the person relying on such an exception. The major
examples in western cultures, apart from so-called "just war", were self-de-
fence and capital punishment after a "fair trial" for an offence which "mer-
ited" it, not all or most of which everyone agrees should still be allowed as
exceptions. In any case, such exceptions should not be extended, in particu-
lar by legalizing euthanasia.
In considering legalizing and institutionalizing euthanasia, we are consid-
ering altering the fundamental presumption against killing each other on
which the morality and law of a civilized society are based. Why apparently
are so many of us so actively considering such a change? Could there be
some socio-biological, genetic or environmental factor that is causing the
current rise in interest in and promotion of euthanasia? One would need to
examine other historical periods and other cultures and probably other spe-
cies to even begin to have some idea whether this could be the case.' 54 It is,
however, important to be aware that what we perceive or feel as our primary
motives in carrying out certain acts may be covering other very complex
realities in this regard. For instance, empathy, compassion and mercy, while
dominant motives on the part of most persons in situations in which they
advocate euthanasia, may not be the only motivations present. It is just pos-
sible that factors such as an increasingly crowded world or even overwhelm-
ing fear about one's own death, especially in the context of a secular,
pluralistic, post-modern societal ethos, could be playing a part in persons
advocating euthanasia.
VIII. THE LANGUAGE OF EUTHANASIA
Language is not neutral. Although this proposition is obvious, it is so
important in relation to the euthanasia debate, that it merits stating. We
form our narratives and our narratives form us - we are, at least in part, the
stories we tell. In particular, "bad" and "good" death "stories" are espe-
cially influential. They also give us access to experiential knowledge and,
often, help us to identify properly our emotional responses and provide op-
portunities to examine these, all of which are essential if we are to respond
wisely to issues raised by death, including by way of euthanasia. At a recent
conference in Boston, 5 ' Dr. Timothy Quill and Dr. Susan Tolle told "sto-
ries", where a potentially "bad" death was converted to "good" death by
154. See, Young, supra, note 63.
155. The American Society of Law and Medicine, "Health Care Professionals and Treat-
ment at the End of Life", 1992 Annual Meeting, October 30-31, 1992, Cambridge, MA.
[Vol. 9:1
The Song of Death
their respective interventions, which, clearly, they were concerned were of
doubtful legality, at best. These were powerful pro-euthanasia narratives.
In contrast, Christine Mitchell read a deeply moving essay written by an
intensive care nurse, who created a situation in which the family of the pa-
tient were included in his dying, through the nurse's unusually sensitive ap-
proach. As the nurse said, this man's dying was a very important event in
the lives of his family and friends, as well as in his., Mitchell proposed that
in characterizing the kind of death a person experiences, we should include
what the person's family and friends will remember about that death and
weave into their own lives.
With the power of language in mind, I would like to analyze, briefly, a
relatively recent document which contains many examples of the way in
which language can be used to influence the euthanasia debate. It also pro-
vides other insights as to how our reactions to euthanasia can be modified
depending on the way in which euthanasia is presented. This document is a
report of the "Institute of Medical Ethics Working Party on the Ethics of
Prolonging Life and Assisting Death"," 6 which was based in London, Eng-
land. The following quotes, except where otherwise indicated, are all taken
from this report.
The Report speaks of "... hasten[ing] death by administration of narcotic
drugs".15 7 This can be compared with the use of curare in The Netherlands
after administration of an injection of a short-acting narcotic, for example,
pentothal, to induce sleep.158 One can query the basis of the decision to use
only narcotic drugs. Could it be because this is less shocking to persons, less
likely to make them react to euthanasia as a different kind of intervention
from, for example, the administration of pain relief treatment which we re-
gard as acceptable and even required. In particular, is the use of narcotics to
carry out euthanasia less likely to elicit different emotional reactions than
those we have to pain relief treatment and also more likely to elicit similar
reactions of the appropriateness and acceptance of the intervention than
would the use of other drugs? Curare which causes total body paralysis is
used in many surgical operations which need such paralysis, in order to give
a surgeon easier access, for example, to the abdominal cavity. As one Dutch
anaesthetist said in conversation, it is not very difficult for an anaesthetist to
carry out euthanasia, because it simply requires giving "half a general anaes-
thetic and just not doing the other half - the resuscitation". General anaes-
thetics are almost always given for therapeutic reasons and in order to heal.
156. "Assisted Death", The Lancet 1990; ii:610-613.
157. Ibid., p.6 10.
158. M. Angell, "Euthanasia", New England Journal of Medicine 1988: 319:1348-50. See
also R.G. Twycross, "Assisted Death: A Reply", The Lancet 1990; ii:796-798.
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Does the linking of euthanasia with this procedure, even its confusion with
it, cause us to see and to react to euthanasia as a healing, therapeutic inter-
vention? 59 If so, this is undesirable, which is not necessarily to say that one
would be opposed to euthanasia, if it were not able to be viewed in this way.
Rather, euthanasia, itself, must be thought and felt about as clearly as possi-
ble. In order to achieve this, one needs to guard against surrounding consid-
eration of euthanasia with circumstances likely to cause confusion between
how one thinks and feels in these circumstances about certain decision-mak-
ing at the end of life other than euthanasia, and how one thinks and feels
about euthanasia in the same circumstances. As Callahan has said, "[it is
important in all moral debates to use very accurate terms that do not
anaethetize our feelings". 16
The Report refers to the terms "assisted suicide" or "homicide upon re-
quest", and states that "these terms are not used lest their legal implications
confuse the ethical issues [of euthanasia]". 16  This is to disconnect law and
ethics - to stop the law informing ethics. Too often, in the past, we have
simply equated ethics with the law, that is, we have tended to assume that if
certain conduct is legal, it is also ethical. This approach can be character-
ized as law informing ethics. More recently, we have realized that ethics
must inform law and, indeed, that often the ethical analysis should be pri-
mary and the legal analysis secondary. But it still remains necessary for law
to inform ethics. The approach proposed in the Report has the effect of
stopping legal precedent and history from informing our reactions to and
decisions concerning euthanasia. It stops our conditioned response that
these acts are wrong, because the law has always viewed them as wrong. We
need to be aware of this reaction and to consider whether or not we are
correct in thinking that any given act, including euthanasia, is wrong. But
we should not eliminate this reaction, in order to allow ourselves to believe
that conduct, that otherwise we would regard as wrong, is acceptable.
The Report then continues: "more important is rejection of the word 'kill-
ing" This word is generally used to indicate a violent act in war or crime,
rather than to describe a gentle act of merciful clinical care. 162 This latter
description is the characterization of the act of euthanasia advocated by per-
sons who are pro-choice regarding euthanasia. While the word merciful,
159. See, for example, de Wachter, supra, note 12, p.24, who quotes a Dutch physician as
saying that "there are situations in which the best way to heal the patient is to help him die
peacefully and the doctor who in such situation grants the patient's request acts as the healer
par excellence".
160. As quoted by de Wachter, supra, note 12, p.2 9 .
161. Supra, note 156, p.6 1 1.
162. Ibid. (emphasis added).
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almost always correctly describes the motives of persons carrying out an act
of euthanasia, it needs to be queried whether it should be regarded as, or is
truly, an act of clinical care or a gentle act. Some of the reasons that might
cause persons to seek to medicalize euthanasia have been discussed above163.
The danger in such medicalization is, again, that we could automatically
think and feel about euthanasia in the same way that we think and feel about
other clinical care, and this is neither appropriate nor honest, no matter
whether we are "pro" or "anti" euthanasia.
The Report continues: "If. . . the doctor is confident that the patient's
disabilities, coupled with his genuine distress about the trouble and expense of
the care he needs, make continued life devoid of any enjoyment, the doctor's
response [whether or not to provide euthanasia] will depend on the more gen-
eral question of how he regards his ethical responsibilities in relation to assist-
ing death".1 64  This statement raises many issues. Very importantly,
economic cost factors are recognized as being relevant. Their introduction
as a valid consideration in the context of euthanasia is, however, attributed
to the altruism of persons seeking euthanasia, rather than to concerns of the
family or the society which must pay. This leads to consideration of two
very different principles on which arguments in support of euthanasia can be
based - one is that of individual liberty, the other is the right to kill in the
interests of others, for example, the family or society. The justifications that
are argued in the latter context can include cost saving, eugenics, justice and
punishment - for example, capital punishment - or protection, as in a "just
war". Usually the justifications within this latter category that could argua-
bly be relevant to euthanasia, are not presented overtly in that context.
Rather the focus, as in the above quotation, even when the interest being
promoted in allowing euthanasia might be an interest of society, for exam-
ple, cost-saving, is on the individual who is the subject of euthanasia and on
that person's individual liberty, in this case, to be able to choose to avoid the
distress of causing costs to others. In a similar vein, there are claims that in
The Netherlands "the highest terms of praise have been applied to the re-
quest to die: this act is 'brave,' 'wise,' and 'progressive.' All efforts are made
to convince people that this is what they ought to do, what society expects of
them, what is best for themselves and their families. The result is, as
[Dutch] Attorney General T.M. Schalken stated in 1984, that 'elderly people
begin to consider themselves a burden to the society, and feel under an obli-
gation to start conversations on euthanasia, or even to request it.' ,,165
163. Supra, pp.3 1-3 3 .
164. Supra, note 156, p. 6 1 1 (emphasis added).
165. Fenigsen, supra, note 50, p. 2 4 .
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It also needs to be recognized that the two principles which can be argued
as justifications for euthanasia - individual liberty and interests of society -
may be in conflict. For example, if a person's right to live is denied on the
basis of society's right to cut short a life when the interests of society require
this, a choice must be made between upholding individual liberty - in this
case exercised as a choice to live rather than to die - and the interests of
society. In this respect, it is interesting to note the allegation that "a major-
ity of the same [Dutch] public that proclaims support for voluntary euthana-
sia . . . also accepts involuntary active euthanasia - that is denial of free
choice and of the right to live".' 66 This is a very disturbing statement and
many such statements by its author, have been challenged. 167 Nevertheless,
the statement merits consideration and the claim that "involuntary active
euthanasia" is regarded as acceptable, may be reflected in practice in The
Netherlands to a much greater degree than has, in general, been believed.
168
The statement could indicate that there is a view on the part of the public,
that when individual interests, including liberty, and perceived interests of
society are in conflict, the latter take priority. It is worth noting that com-
munity interests can be used, as here, as an argument in favour of euthanasia
or as an argument against it. The position taken in this paper, namely, that
even if one finds euthanasia acceptable at an individual level, it is unaccept-
able at a societal level and that the interests of society take priority and
require that euthanasia remain prohibited, is an example in the latter re-
spect. Different community interests are involved in each case. The com-
munity interests served by allowing euthanasia would be, for instance, saving
on economic costs to the community. The community interests served by
prohibiting euthanasia include maintaining the symbolism and practice of
not killing other persons.
The Report also proposes that to assist death is "a moral advance rather
than a moral decline". 169 This leads to the argument that it is unethical not
to allow euthanasia and, indeed, this argument has been espoused. 17 0 Ethics
166. Ibid., p.23. The term "involuntary active euthanasia" is probably not intended to
include (at least one hopes this is the case) euthanasia carried out against the refusal of consent
of a person. Rather it probably contemplates allowing the possibility of euthanasia on those
unable to consent or to refuse consent for themselves.
167. See, for example, correspondence Hastings Center Report 1989; 19:47 et seq.
168. See, Keown, supra, note 140, pp.4 1- 4 2 .
169. Supra, note 156, p. 6 1 1 (emphasis added).
170. CBC Radio, "Cross Country Check-up", conversation between Dr. David Lewis and
M.A. Somerville, November, 1991. Dr. Lewis, a Vancouver psychologist with AIDS, who
assisted eight other persons with AIDS to commit suicide, after announcing in the media that
he would kill himself, did so.
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has long been an argument against euthanasia, now it also becomes an argu-
ment for euthanasia.
It is also argued in the Report that "it would be unjust if only some doctors,
as at present, continued to relieve terminal suffering by assisting death in the
privacy of the home, while others, especially in hospital, did not do this".171 It
seems to be proposed here, that justice requires that euthanasia be available.
What would this proposition mean, if applied to other illegal acts? For ex-
ample, to take an extreme case, if child prostitution is available to some (as it
is), is this in itself an indication that it should be available to all? Moreover,
to repeat, the fact that acts of euthanasia occur, does not mean that it is
morally acceptable or that it should be legalized and institutionalized in our
society. 172
The Working Party in its Report also argues that the act/omission distinc-
tion is not morally relevant, that is, that "killing and letting die" 1 73 are mor-
ally equivalent. It states that '" . . although, allowing death to occur often
seems less wrong than deliberate killing, intent, circumstances, and outcome
all have a role in determining moral judgment on the act. When the intention
and outcome of killing and letting die are equivalent (in each case a good
intention and a fatal outcome) then the circumstances become the crucial fac-
tor in the moral evaluation of killing and letting die".174 This is to adopt a
situational ethics approach, that is, that there are no absolute rights and
wrongs, including, with respect to killing another person; rather the morality
of a situation depends on all the circumstances. The Working Party is cor-
rect, as has already been discussed,175 that some omissions could constitute
euthanasia, and that such omissions and the act of killing can be morally and
even legally equivalent, for example, when there is a duty to treat and death
results from with-holding treatment. But there is not always a duty to treat,
for instance, when treatment is futile or when the patient has given a valid
refusal of treatment. In summary, not all situations of killing by an act and
letting die through an omission are morally equivalent. Moreover, recogni-
tion that "there are circumstances, in clinical practice as well as in hypothet-
ical debate, where the logical difference between act and omission, between
killing and letting die, might be unable to bear decisive weight ... does not
imply that a decision in favour of killing is therefore permissible in situations
where a decision not to maintain life is permissible".
176
171. Supra, note 156, p. 6 1 1.
172. See, supra, pp. 39 -44 .
173. Supra, note 156.
174. Ibid. (emphasis added).
175. Supra, pp.7-10.
176. B. Callaghan, Correspondence "Assisted Death", The Lancet 1990; ii:1012.
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From a legal point of view, many of the cases in which the act/omission
distinction is relevant, involve the connected issues of duty and causation,
the latter of which has already been discussed.177 The common law imposes
a duty to take reasonable care not to harm others by one's acts. There is,
however, no general duty not to harm others by omissions. One is only lia-
ble for an omission if there was a pre-existing duty to act. In other words,
one is not liable for "mere" omissions, that is, omissions in a situation in
which there was no duty to act. In cases in which there is a pre-existing duty
to act, liability for an omission can be avoided if it is regarded, in law, as not
having caused the damage or prohibited outcome. The court used just this
distinction in the case of Re Nancy B. 17 . The Judge held that a physician
who disconnected a respirator, pursuant to the informed request of the pa-
tient, would not be held, in either criminal or civil law, to have caused the
death of the patient.
In some ways, the argument based on criticism of the act/omission dis-
tinction, that it is irrelevant to distinguish between the cause of death being
withdrawal of the respirator, or underlying disease, or a lethal injection, be-
cause whichever one is involved the patient ends up dead, says too much. At
one point, we all end up dead, but when and how we die is relevant to
whether or not another person could be considered morally culpable or held
legally liable for causing our death. It is true that use of the concept of
causation in the law, involves an exercise of discretion through which a
court can find either culpability or non-culpability for prohibited outcome
according to whether or not it finds causation on the part of the accused or
defendant, with respect to this outcome. But it is not true, as is sometimes
alleged, that the presence of such discretion means that the concept of causa-
tion is without substance and simply a manipulative tool for, as the case may
be, either attributing or not attributing culpability. Callahan explains that
"the mistake here ... lies in confusing causality and culpability, and in fail-
ing to note the way in which human societies have overlaid natural causes
with moral rules and interpretations. Causality (by which . . . [Callahan]
means the direct physical causes of death) and culpability (by which ... [he]
means our attribution of moral responsibility to human actions) are confused
• . . [in some] circumstances". 17 9 It may well be, however, that some in-
stances of the use of the legal concept of causation exhibit such confusion.
The matter of drawing lines, such as in relation to causation, which are,
sometimes, alleged to be simply artificial or semantic distinctions, is often
177. Supra, p.9.
178. Nancy B. supra, note 20.
179. D. Callahan, "When Self-Determination Runs Amok", Hastings Center Report 1992;
22(2):52,53.
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raised as an argument against the persons who oppose euthanasia, but agree
with rights to refuse treatment. For example, it is also argued that there are
only artificial differences between legally actionable omissions and non-ac-
tionable ones which result in death, because whether or not a duty is found
to be present is a matter of discretion and value judgement which has only a
facade of objectivity. Likewise, it is argued that the distinctions between
suicide and euthanasia will not bear moral weight and should not be of legal
import. These lines, although in some cases fine, are, however, both real and
important. They are lines that correspond not just to logic, but also, I would
suggest, to collective wisdom, precedent and deeply felt intuitive, moral and
emotional responses. These "other ways of knowing" must be given space
within which to function and the knowledge to which they give access must
be properly taken into account. Moreover, even the critics of drawing lines,
who are usually pro-choice on euthanasia, need themselves to draw lines
between those instances of euthanasia which are acceptable and those which
are not, which usually depends on circumstances, purpose and consent in
relation to the act causing death.' In summary, unless all acts of euthana-
sia were to be allowed, which has never been proposed, the drawing of lines
is unavoidable. Therefore, that they draw lines which allow respect for re-
fusals of treatment and provision of necessary treatment for the relief of pain
and other symptoms of serious physical distress, even if this could shorten
life, but prohibit euthanasia, should not be a basis of objection to the case of
the persons who are anti-euthanasia. All participants in the euthanasia de-
bate draw lines. It is, rather, that different lines are drawn by those who are
''pro" as compared with those who are "anti" euthanasia.
The Working Party then puts forward another interesting argument.
"Doctors, after all, have no religious scruples about interfering with
predestined death in formerly fatal illnesses which they can now cure. In what
circumstances, then, is a doctor ever ethically justified in assisting death?"'"'
There is about this statement, something of an aura that we have accepted
"playing God" with respect to curing, therefore, why should we not accept
"playing God" with respect to killing. It seems to be implied that interfering
in the "natural order" to cure in some way helps to justify interfering in the
"natural order" to kill. We need to consider whether we need to justify
interfering in the "natural order" in either case. I would suggest, that we do.
When the purpose was to cure, or at least therapeutic, there probably used to
be a presumption that the interference was justified. In more recent times,
however, with our concern about respect for persons and their rights and
180. See, for example, Notes: Harvard Law Review, supra, note 27.
181. Supra, note 156, p.6 12 .
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freedoms, and about over-use of medical technology and its potential to do
harm and not just good, this presumption may no longer operate. This
could be indicated by the fact that, for example, we have evolved principles
that require informed consent to a medical intervention, and we have always
required that the anticipated benefits of an intervention will outweigh its
anticipated harms and risks, before it can be justified. Consequently, one
could regard the presumption that one is justified in interfering in the "natu-
ral order" to cure as partial, but not sufficient, justification for proceeding
with a medical intervention on a person aimed at cure. In other words,
without necessarily identifying it as such, whether through presumption or
proof, we do justify interfering in the "natural order" to cure and, likewise,
we would need to justify interfering in it to kill. The latter cannot be justi-
fied simply by the argument that we interfere in the "natural order" to cure
and this in itself justifies interfering to kill when this is "ethically justified".
The Working Group was probably addressing, here, the argument raised
against euthanasia, that hastening death is to interfere in the natural order
and such interference is wrong. They are correct that this is not necessarily
a strong argument, although whether or not it is, depends on the circum-
stances, the way in which we interfere in the natural order, and the conse-
quences of this interference. In particular, there is a great difference between
interfering to cure as compared with to kill. Consequently, allowance of the
former provides no automatic justification for the latter, as seems to be im-
plied in the Report. Again, this does not necessarily mean that such interfer-
ence to kill cannot be justified, it just cannot be justified in this way.
A more subtle argument along the same lines as the above, is that
medicine, itself, creates "an obligation to honour requests for euthanasia.
When life-prolonging technology has led to what the patient believes is a life
not worth living ... does this create a special responsibility for the medical
profession in general and the patient's doctor in particular to consider sym-
pathetically sustained requests for active voluntary euthanasia?"." 2 One
possible interpretation of the rationale that underlies this question, is that
when we have prolonged a person's life through interference in the natural
order, that life can be stopped through euthanasia without offence to the
natural order, because if it were not for our initial interference the person
would be dead. A wide application of this reasoning and the precedent it
could establish, would be terrifying. Any person whose life was probably or
certainly saved by antibiotics or, for example, surgery for appendicitis,
would come within its parameters.
In the context of examining the language of euthanasia, it is worth noting
182. de Wachter, supra, note 12, p.28, quoting R. Gillon.
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the description of what the Working Party sees as being at issue, namely,
'" . . the useless prolongation of miserable life.. .". ,83
The Report continues: "a doctor's duty to prolong life is not concerned with
all forms of life, but only human life of a quait that the person concerned
wishes to have prolonged"."8 4 One would need to ask here what counts as
"quality human life", as compared with a "form of life", because these are
contrasted? First, it is noteworthy that the word human is left out in the
first mention of life, although it would seem that is what is being spoken of.
Physicians, as such, are not in general concerned with other forms of life.
Second, there is presently a state of high activity in our modern, western
societies, with respect to use of a quality of life principle. This concept was
developed largely in order to found a claim to health care. It is now being
used, as in the Report, as a justification for denying such care.' 85 There are
many other relevant questions raised here which are well-known. Who
judges quality of life? Can it be judged by persons, even in relation to them-
selves, in advance of experiencing a certain quality of life? Should a person's
quality of life be judged in relation to the cost of maintaining his or her life?
Moreover, what would we do with respect to persons who do not have, or
who never have had, the capacity for wishes? Is there no duty to prolong
their lives?
The Report is unclear in this respect. It states that it is "concerned solely
with occasions when assisted death is requested -not the related issues of end-
ing the lives of infants, or of patients who are unconscious or unable to make a
valid request".'16 But later, it states that "[w]ith a patient who cannot express
a wish, the doctor's duty is to prolong life only if it can be assumed to be such
that this would be the patient's wish, or if, as in the case of infants or mentally
handicapped patients, there is nothing to contradict the presumption in favour
of prolonging life".' 7 Although there is reliance on a presumption in favour
of life, clearly it is contemplated that this can be rebutted in the case of a
person who is not, and possibly has never been, competent. The conditions
in which such a rebuttal would occur are entirely unstated. Moreover, the
difference in nuance between the language that the doctor has a "duty... to
prolong life only if. . .", that the Report uses, and a doctor has a duty to
prolong life unless.... which more accurately reflects the position of the law,
183. Ibid. (emphasis added).
184. Ibid. (emphasis added).
185. See M.A. Somerville, "Autonomy in Health Care", Proceedings of the 25th Anniver-
sary Congress of the Dutch Association on Medical Law, "Healthy By Right (Met Recht
Gezond)", Nijmegen, The Netherlands, May 1992 (forthcoming publication).
186. Supra, note 156, p.6 1 1.
187. Ibid., p.613.
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should be noted. The former is a suspensive condition, that is, the duty to
prolong life only arises on certain conditions being fulfilled. The latter is a
resolutive condition, that is, there is a duty to prolong life unless certain
conditions negating the duty occur. Opposite basic presumptions underlie
these two approaches. The latter is much more protective of life than the
former, in circumstances of equal doubt as to whether or not life should be
prolonged. 188
The Report concludes that "if... relief is not possible, distress is severe,
and the patient asks to have his life ended, the circumstances are analogous to
those of the soldier's wounded comrade, the soldier's gun being replaced by the
doctor's syringe... the balance of the moral argument... shift[s] towards
asking why death should not be assisted. The greater the unrelieved pain and
distress, the more ethical a doctor's decision to assist death if the patient
desires it". 89 This is to propose a change of basic presumption from one
against euthanasia, to one for euthanasia. It also raises the issue of whether
there are degrees of "ethicality" in relation to euthanasia, and if so, at what
point can it be characterized as ethical or, more importantly, unethical. Or
does this imply that decisions to terminate life in the circumstances de-
scribed are never unethical, but some are more ethical than others? Finally,
the military analogy is one not usually encountered in the literature on eu-
thanasia. If it is true that soldiers shoot their wounded comrades, is this
morally and legally acceptable? If so, does it have relevance to the argu-
ments for and against euthanasia? Certainly, not only pacifists would agree
that we need to rethink our attitudes to war, including our justifications for
engaging in it, and, as part of this re-consideration, rules governing conduct
in that context. It is also noteworthy that according to this statement, pa-
tients need not be terminally ill, they need only have an incurable disease, to
justify providing them with euthanasia.
Certainly, more extreme examples of the use of language to promote sui-
cide by terminally ill persons and euthanasia, are to be found in a text previ-
ously referred to, Final Exit' 90 by Derek Humphry. Just a few of these
examples will be given here. For instance, the hospice movement and the
pro-choice on euthanasia movement are presented as consistent and compat-
ible with each other: "Quality of life, personal dignity, self-control, and above
all, choice, are what both hospice and the euthanasia movement are concerned
with ". But many, if not most, persons in the hospice movement, while
188. See, infra, pp.62-67.
189. Ibid..
190. Supra, note 3.
191. Ibid., p.36.
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agreeing with these aims, in general, strongly disagree with euthanasia as a
means of achieving them.
There are efforts to normalize the carrying out of euthanasia. Humphry
writes that "[if you are unfortunately obliged to end your life in a hospital or
motel, it is gracious to leave a note apologising for the shock and inconven-
ience to the staff. I have also heard of an individual leaving a generous tip to a
motel staff".192 This could also be seen as implying that a hospital offers
nothing more to a dying person than a motel, and that one's committing
suicide in a motel is nothing more than a serious inconvenience to the staff,
for which, at least in some measure, they can be compensated by a tip.
Other examples of the use of language to normalize euthanasia include that
of spousal love and devotion: "[A] surprising number of people, particularly
devoted couples, want to handle the process themselves. It is their final act of
love together". 193 It merits noting that, while Humphry claims that his book
is only intended as a guide to suicide for terminally ill persons, he contem-
plates that it could be used by a non-terminally ill spouse in a double suicide
with his or her terminally ill spouse.19 4
One of Humphry's most highly recommended methods of suicide, that of
the plastic bag and "either a large rubber band or a ribbon",195 plus
"[slufficient sleeping pills to ensure two-hours sleep".196 could also be seen as
seeking normalization of self-willed death, including euthanasia, by reducing
reactions of repugnance or horror in relation to it, in several ways. First,
part of the equipment suggested - "a ribbon" - can be associated with events
such as tying-up a little girl's hair or wrapping a present - warm, caring,
gratifying and life-affirming activities. 197 One can query whether this word
was chosen to elicit such associations, in order to help to normalize suicide
and, by association, euthanasia. Then, there is a suggestion that persons
should undertake trial runs both of the sleeping pills and the plastic bag. A
trial run of the plastic bag so impressed the author that he performed it for
".... [his] Hemlock Chapter meeting a week or so later. Everyone was both
amused and impressed.. . ". 9 He "urged them to go home and try it on for
themselves in order to get more comfortable with the whole concept". 99 The
final decision, Humphry says, is "should you use a clear plastic bag or an
192. Ibid., p.89.
193. Ibid., p 96.
194. Ibid., Chapter Twenty, "Going Together?", pp.100-102.
195. Ibid., p.97.
196. Ibid., pp.97-98.
197. Moreover, in wet weather, one's daily newspaper can even be delivered in a potential
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opaque one. That is a matter of taste. Loving the world as I do, I will opt for
a clear one if I have to".2 0 At one level, this statement indicates some sense
of unreality, some hint of fantasy, of disbelief that death - the final exit - will
result. The story told of Barnum's and Bailey's circus comes to mind.
When the tent in which the circus' sideshows (the most tattooed man, the
two-headed serpent, the giant woman, etc.) were exhibited became too
crowded, a man would walk around the tent ringing a bell and displaying a
board on which was written "this way to the egress". People would follow
him, thinking that they were being led towards some other even more exotic
exhibit, often imagining it would be a rare bird, only to find that they had
been led out of the tent. When they exclaimed that they had not finished
looking at the exhibits, they were told that they could re-enter the tent on
paying another admission fee, to which they objected. With euthanasia,
however, re-entry is not an option, unless we believe in reincarnation.
IX. STRUCTURING THE ANALYSIS
(A) Placing Euthanasia in Context
Euthanasia must be viewed, first, in the context of other medical interven-
tions and non-interventions at the end of life and, second, in a broader con-
text. These contexts can only be very broadly and superficially sketched
here. The first context referred to can be described as a continuum which
ranges from rights to refuse treatment; to withdrawal of "life support", for
example, respiratory support; withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion;201 provision of treatment for the relief of pain or other symptoms of
serious physical distress (even that which could shorten life, if this is neces-
sary to relieve pain or other symptoms of serious physical distress); suicide;
assisted suicide; and euthanasia.
It is proposed that there is a difference in kind not just degree, between, on
the one hand, euthanasia and, on the other hand, interventions comprising
all the other "categories" leaving aside the category of assisted suicide. This
raises the question of where assisted suicide, in particular, physician assisted
suicide, fits. Opinion is divided as to whether it should be classified with
euthanasia or with suicide, or even as some "sui generis" category. If em-
phasis is placed on the fact that assisted suicide involves an act of an individ-
200. Ibid., p.98.
201. Although artificial hydration and nutrition are, also, life support treatment and re-
cently have been characterized as no different from other forms of life support treatment - see,
for example, Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 SW 2d 408 (1988) (U.S.S.C.) - in the past, their with-
drawal has been regarded as different from withdrawal of other forms of life support. In part,
this was because of fear of inflicting serious suffering by allowing a person to die from dehydra-
tion and starvation and also the effect on societal symbolism of doing this.
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ual with respect to himself or herself, it could be treated as suicide - a private
act. Or should we emphasize that the assistance of another is required, so
that we have "concerted communal action" and, therefore, have a public
action which should not be legitimized and institutionalized?2 2 Moreover,
when physicians are involved, the profession of medicine itself is implicated.
The profession of medicine is a public enterprise, which means that physi-
cians' involvement in assisting suicide is not, essentially, a private matter.2°3
Some incidents of "assisted suicide" belong in the category of suicide, for
instance, a patient uses medication not prescribed primarily for this purpose,
to commit suicide. Others belong in the category of euthanasia: for exam-
ple, where a physician's action is morally equivalent to euthanasia and le-
gally equivalent to this except for the absence of causation, because the
patient's act in killing himself or herself is held to be a novus actus in-
terveniens cutting the chain of causation between the physician's act and the
infliction of death; or, likewise, where the physician provides the means to
commit suicide to the patient, with an intention2' of helping the patient to
do so. In general, the term physician assisted suicide is only used to describe
the latter types of intervention, not the former, that is, those that are charac-
terized here as being equivalent to euthanasia. Sometimes the term assisted
suicide is also extended to include an act of euthanasia that involves a physi-
cian administering a lethal injection. Again, in this context the use of lan-
guage is important. In particular, the term "physician assisted death" tends
to be used to replace or to include physician assisted suicide and then inter-
preted to include euthanasia. The language of physician assisted death,
rather than that of euthanasia, is almost certainly employed to try to avoid
the disapproval and win the support of some persons who oppose euthana-
sia, but do not oppose suicide or, in the case of some of these persons, physi-
cians assisting in this.2 °5
It is, also, interesting to note that in Germany, physician assisted suicide is
not tolerated, but assistance in suicide by non-physicians is, apparently, re-
garded as acceptable.2"6 This can be compared with the approach of most of
the persons in North America who are promoting physician assisted death.
They propose that an exception to the crime of assisting suicide should be
202. D. Callahan, "Can We Return Death to Disease?", Hastings Center Report 1989;
19(1)(Spec.Supp.):4,5.
203. Keown, supra, note 140, p.40.
204. For a definition of intention in the law, see, supra, note 7.
205. See, M.P. Battin, supra, note 114, who says that, "because permitting assisted suicide
would require a less dramatic change in the law, I think that the United States will come to
accept assisted suicide in the relatively near future, officially as well as tacitly, but is likely to
resist legalizing active euthanasia for a longer time".
206. Ibid..
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allowed, but only for physicians. Clearly, important cultural and historical
facts influence such attitudes, as well as individual and societal attitudes to
physicians and the medical profession. It is essential to be aware of such
differences, because they can both shake us out of a complacency that our
way of viewing a situation is the only way, and provide crucial insights into
the positions which we choose to adopt.
From a legal point of view, the very recent Canadian case of Rodriguez vs.
Attorney General of British Columbia and Attorney General of Canada2"7 is
unique with respect to the claim that the plaintiff sought to enforce. The
plaintiff, Mrs. Rodriguez, suffers from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Lou
Gehrig's disease) a degenerative neuromuscular condition which affects
among other physiological functions breathing and swallowing. She sought
a ruling from the court that the prohibition on aiding and abetting suicide in
section 241 of the Canadian Criminal Code2 °" is invalid on the grounds that
it contravenes the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,2" in particu-
lar, section 7, which protects "the right to life, liberty and security of the
person"; section 12, "the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment"; and section 15, which provides for equality
before and under the law, and equal protection and equal benefit of the law
without discrimination, in particular, on the basis of physical disability. In a
detailed judgement, the Supreme Court of British Columbia, the court of
first instance, acknowledged that "the state's interference through criminal
law when a person's life or health may be in danger may violate an individ-
ual's right under s. 7 to security of the person". 2 '0 However, section 7 is not
violated by the prohibition on assisting suicide, because in the absence of this
prohibition, the plaintiff would still have no right to assistance in committing
suicide, therefore, no right protected by the Charter is affected by the prohi-
bition. The court noted that sections 7 through 14 of the Charter are placed
under the heading "Legal Rights" and relying on this characterization and a
judgement of the Supreme Court of Canada as authority, adopted a narrow
interpretation of the rights protected by section 7. In summary, the court
held that the restrictions on liberty and security of the person against which
section 7 protects, are only "those that occur as a result of an individual's
interaction with the justice system and its administration".2 1 The court
207. The Supreme Court of British Columbia No.4040/92, Victoria Registry, December
29, 1992, Melvin, J.
208. R.S.C. 1985 c. C-46 (as amended).
209. Constitution Act, 1982, Part I.
210. Supra, note 207, p. 9.
211. Ibid., p.13, citing Lamer, C.J. in Reference re: ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal
Code (1990), 56 C.C.C. (3d) 65.
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found that the plaintiff was not involved in any such interaction and, there-
fore, section 7 was inapplicable. Moreover, the cause of the plaintiff's inabil-
ity to carry out her decision to commit suicide would not be any restriction
on her rights, but, as her health deteriorates, her illness, and this "does not
amount to an infringement of a right to life, liberty or security of the person
by the state".'"
The right against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment was held to
be limited to "state-imposed punishment in the context of criminal law re-
garding a person brought into the legal system" '213 and, consequently, not
applicable to the plaintiff's case. Likewise, the prohibition on assisting sui-
cide was held not to offend the prohibition in section 15 on discrimination on
the basis of physical or mental disability, because the former "is designed to
protect, not discriminate",2" 4 regardless of a person's "condition or the
cause of any vulnerability which may result in them expressing a desire to
terminate their lives".215 Moreover, even if rights and freedoms guaranteed
by the Charter were violated by the prohibition on assisting suicide, such a
restriction would be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society
and, therefore, would fall within the "saving provision" of section 1 of the
Charter and be constitutionally valid.
The case was appealed to the Court of Appeal- of British Columbia
216
which split in the judgements handed down - two judges dismissed the ap-
peal and one, the Chief Justice, upheld it, finding for the plaintiff Ms. Rodri-
guez. The judgements will not be analyzed in any detail here, except to note
that they each include consideration of how section 7 of the Charter should
be interpreted in the "legislative, social and philosophical context of our so-
ciety", in relation to continuing to prohibit or allowing physician assisted
suicide for terminally ill persons, in particular, competent persons, who are
unable to commit suicide without such assistance. The Court of Appeal fo-
cused on establishing the breadth of the right to security of the person in
section 7 of the Charter and what constitutes a justifiable infringement of
this - that is, an infringement that is "in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice", to quote the section itself.
The Chief Justice, in dissent, found that Ms. Rodriguez was deprived of
both her right to security of her person by the state in enacting the prohibi-
212. Ibid., p.15.
213. Ibid., p.19.
214. Ibid., p. 2 1 .
215. Ibid..
216. Court of Appeal for British Columbia, No.V01800, Victoria Registry, March 8, 1993,
McEachern, C.J., Proudfoot, J., and Hollinrake, J..
217. Ibid., p.46, per Hollinrake, J..
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tion on assisted suicide in section 241(b) of the Criminal Code and that this
deprivation was "not in accordance with principles of fundamental justice",
or saved by being a limitation on a guaranteed freedom which can be demon-
strably justified in a free and democratic society, as provided by section 1 of
the Charter. The Chief Justice held "that any provision [of law] which im-
poses an indeterminate period of senseless physical and psychological suffer-
ing upon someone who is shortly to die anyway cannot conform with any
principle of fundamental justice".218
Like the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Hollinrake held that the prohibition on
assisted suicide in section 241(b) of the Criminal Code, deprived Ms. Rodri-
guez of her section 7 right to security of the person, but, unlike the Chief
Justice, he held that this deprivation was in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice and, therefore, section 24 1(b) was not unconstitutional.
Mme. Justice Proudfoot took a much narrower interpretation of the sec-
tion 7 right, at least in relation to the facts of the case before her. Indeed,
she may, similarly to the court of first instance, have viewed the scope of the
protection given to security of the person by section 7, as being limited to the
"criminal context". Regardless of how her judgement should be interpreted
in this respect, she expressly limits the scope of the rights in section 7, with
the statement that "obviously death is the antithesis of the s. 7 guarantee of
'life, liberty and security of the person' ".29 This observation raises a com-
plex issue that can only be mentioned here. There could be conflict between
respecting a person's right to liberty and security of the person and that
same person's life, if the former rights are broadly interpreted, in particular,
to include respect for the exercise of "positive content" rights to autonomy
and self-determination. One possible response that would accommodate
such conflict is that a right to life is just that, a right and not an obligation,
and, moreover, rights can be waived. An alternative response is that the
rights in section 7 must be interpreted consistently with each other and, con-
sequently, rights to liberty and security of the person may not be used in
such a way as to detract from respect for a person's life. This latter position
can be further supported by reliance on a doctrine of "abuse of rights". It
can be argued that for a person to use his or her rights to liberty or security
of the person in a way that contravenes respect for his or her life, would be
to abuse these rights (that is, to use them for a purpose exactly the contrary
to that which they were intended to achieve) and that such an "abusive" use
is an invalid exercise of those rights.22°
218. Ibid., p. 3 0 .
219. Ibid., p.66, per Proudfoot J..
220. See Procureur Giniral du Canada c. Hdspital Notre-Dame et un autre (ddtendeurs) et
Jan Niemic (mis en cause) [1984] C.S. 426 (Qu6. S.C.); M.A. Somerville, supra, note 35.
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Mme. Justice Proudfoot did not, however base her judgement on section 7
of the Charter. Rather, she held that there was no "lis pendens", no justicia-
ble issue, before the court. Ms. Rodriguez had sought a declaration that if a
physician were willing to help her commit suicide, that unnamed physician
would be exempt from future criminal liability.221 Mme. Justice Proudfoot
concludes that "[t]here can be no doubt that this is a hard case but it ought
not, in my opinion, be allowed to influence the court to make bad law. I
would regard as bad law a precedent which would pave the way for persons
not defendants in either civil or criminal proceedings to seek and obtain im-
munity from liability for unknown persons for offences not yet committed
and which may never be committed".222
Leave to appeal the case to the Supreme Court of Canada, has now been
granted. Therefore, the case will be subject to further analysis and commen-
tary by the judiciary, as well as by parliamentarians, the public, the media
and academics in a wide variety of disciplines. While cases that provoke
such discussion are valuable, we need to keep in mind, as the judge at first
instance states, that "[i]n the case at bar this court is asked to move ...
beyond the judicial domain and into the realm of general public policy".
223
Although the judgements in the Court of Appeal recognize that courts can
be seen as "shying away from the full force of the power entrusted to them
under the Charter" ,224 in saying that "it is the function of Parliament to
legislate",225 ultimately, it will almost certainly be for the legislature to de-
cide whether to continue to prohibit or to allow assistance in committing
suicide.22 6
To return to the descriptive categorization of interventions at the end of
life, with which this section commenced, overlying this is another analysis
that can be applied to classify such interventions in order to determine
whether there are obligations to treat, no such obligation, or obligations not
to treat. This analysis depends on distinguishing between prolonging living
and prolonging dying. The former may or may not be required, for example,
prolonging living is not required when there is valid refusal of treatment by a
competent adult person. Prolonging dying is never required, except possibly
if a competent adult person requests treatment that could have this effect
221. Supra note 216, p.6 8 .
222. Ibid..
223. Supra, note 207, p. 16 .
224. Supra, note 216, p.55, per Hollinrake, J..
225. Ibid..
226. The Parliament of Canada has just voted 140-25 against considering a law to allow
assisted suicide, Canadian Press, "MPs won't consider right-to-die law", [Montreal] The Ga-
zette, 23 March 1993, 8.
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and is able to give informed consent to this treatment.227 Concepts relevant
to not prolonging dying include those of "futility"22 - there is no obligation
to provide futile or useless treatment - and an included or related concept
"proportionality", which recognizes that there can be over-use, as well as
under-use and proper use, of medical treatment, especially when it involves
technology.
A proportionality principle postulates that when the burden of treatment -
harm and suffering inflicted by treatment - is out of proportion to any hoped
for benefit from that treatment, there is no obligation to provide that treat-
ment. There are, of course, very personal and deep value judgements in-
volved in judging such harms and benefits. Consequently, although the
principle is easy to state in theory, it is not always easy to apply in practice.
One way in which the principle becomes easier to apply, in some cases, is
through the mechanism of "advance directives" - legal devices such as the
"living will" and "durable power of attorney" -because as far as possible
these implement the patient's own value judgements regarding harms and
benefits.
Such legal mechanisms mean that a person's right to self determination
can bridge "the incompetence gap", that is, the person's own wishes can still
govern, even after the person has become incompetent to express those
wishes. These legal mechanisms are based on and implement a principle of
respect for persons and for persons' rights to self-determination and auton-
omy. However, a secondary effect may be to benefit others. For example,
withdrawal of treatment, pursuant to patients' own wishes, which has benefi-
cial symbolism of respect for persons and for their wishes concerning them-
selves, also saves the community or family the cost of treatment. This can be
compared with withdrawing such treatment on the basis of the decision of
another, which can have harmful symbolism, for example, that the lives of
such persons are not worth living and, therefore, not worth the cost of
maintaining.
Issues raised by the rapidly evolving use of "advance directives" in deci-
sion-making at the end of life will not be discussed here. It needs to be kept
in mind, however, that this area forms the "surroundings" of euthanasia
227. It is arguable whether there are duties to provide treatment in such circumstances
and, indeed, it is likely that this matter will be litigated in the near future. There has, recently,
been a case in Quebec involving a comatose man whose family wanted life support treatment
continued, when the physician and hospital wished to withdraw it. The case was settled out of
court. The Wanglie case in the United States, also, raises this issue. See, M. Angell, "The
Case of Helga Wanglie: A New Kind of 'Right to Die' Case", New England Journal of
Medicine 1991; 325:511-512.
228. See, S. Wolf, "Conflict Between Doctor and Patient", (1988) 16 Law, Medicine and
Health Care, 197-203. See also addendum, p. 628.
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and, although it is argued that there is a difference in kind between euthana-
sia and other situations involving decision-making and interventions at the
end of life, what happens in one of these areas clearly can influence what
happens in the others.
(B) Identifying Basic or Initial Presumptions
The are four possible prima facie presumptions from which analysis of
euthanasia can commence. These are: (i) "no . . .", that is, euthanasia is
absolutely prohibited; (ii) "no ... unless . . .", that is, there is a basic pre-
sumption against euthanasia, unless certain conditions are fulfilled, but it
will be allowed in some circumstances; (iii) "yes ... but . . .", that is, eutha-
nasia is allowed, but in some circumstances it will be prohibited; and (iv)
6yes . . .", that is, euthanasia is allowed.
The choice of the first or last presumption clearly reflects a major differ-
ence with respect to whether or not euthanasia is acceptable in a given soci-
ety. The second and third presumptions are closer to each other, but the
choice between them is not neutral. The symbolism of a "no ... unless..."
presumption is closer to the traditional symbolism against euthanasia,
whereas the symbolism of a "yes... but. . ." presumption is that of a society
which accepts euthanasia. Moreover, the basic presumption will govern in
situations of equal doubt as to whether or not conditions for an exception are
fulfilled. Therefore, a "no... unless.. ." presumption would rule against
euthanasia in conditions of doubt, and a "yes . . . but . . ." presumption
would rule in favour of euthanasia in the same conditions. Further, a person
relying on an exception normally has the burden of proving that the excep-
tion applies. Therefore, a person carrying out euthanasia under a "no ...
unless.. ." presumption would have the burden of proving that euthanasia
was justified in any given circumstances. In contrast, a person opposing eu-
thanasia would have the burden of showing that euthanasia was unjustified,
in any given circumstances, under a "yes ... but . . ." presumption.
It is interesting to analyze the situation in The Netherlands in terms of
these presumptions. The Netherlands seems to have adopted a "no... un-
less . . ." prima facie presumption in practice, and a "yes ... but" prima
facie presumption in theory - because, as already noted, the legal justification
for carrying out euthanasia is that the defence of "force majeure" - in the
sense of conflicting duties - applies to excuse the otherwise prohibited con-
duct which reflects a "no ... unless" approach. It would seem, however,
that the practical effect of the procedural guidelines for instituting a prosecu-
tion for allegedly unjustified euthanasia, is that a burden of proof of lack of
justification is on the persons who wish to prosecute, rather than any burden
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of justification being on those who carried out euthanasia. This reflects a
"yes ... but .. ." prima facie presumption.
Probably, and paradoxically, the most basic presumption relevant to the
area of euthanasia is that in favour of life, which may differ from sanctity of
life in that the former, while primary, may be rebuttable, the latter is often
argued to be absolute. The presumption in favour of life operates as a funda-
mental principle in both our legal and ethical systems. The questions raised
by this principle in the context of euthanasia include: When would quality
of life considerations, if ever, displace this presumption? Could a doctrine of
necessity ever apply, such that it justifies over-riding the presumption in fa-
vour of life? Pain relief treatment that is necessary, but could shorten life, is
such an example. Can respect for the person and the person's rights to au-
tonomy and self-determination displace this presumption? Respect for com-
petent persons' informed refusals of treatment provide an example in this
respect. Can claims of the community, for example, cost saving, ever dis-
place it? Is respect for the person a reason different in kind from other rea-
sons proposed as justifications for displacing the presumption in favour of
life? Is respect for the person a preferable reason for displacing a presump-
tion in favour of life, because it is less of an affront, or at least a less direct
one, to the sanctity of life value, because, arguably, this also is based on
respect for the person? But is this true; is sanctity of life based on respect for
the person, or is it a value that principally protects the community? For
example, does it have a function similar to that of early criminal law, the aim
of which was not so much to protect the individual for the sake of the indi-
vidual, but to protect the individual for the sake of the society to which that
individual belonged? It is also not irrelevant whether detraction from an
important value, such as sanctity of life, is latent or overt. We are much
more tolerant of latent detractions from important values, than overt ones,
because the former do not threaten society and its symbolism in the same
way. We need to keep this in mind in relation to euthanasia, legalization of
which would be an overt threat to the value of sanctity of life.
Moreover, as we know, not only are ends important, but also means,
which include the principles used and reasoning applied in justifying a
course of conduct. For example, death resulting from respect for a compe-
tent person's refusal of treatment does not cause damage to the value of the
sanctity of life to the same extent, if at all, as euthanasia as defined in this
text229 would do. Further, there can be a vast difference in terms of the
precedent set by different lines of reasoning used to support decisions con-
cerning treatment of persons at the end of life, although the conduct and
229. See, supra, pp.3-4.
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outcome in the case that sets the precedent would be the same whichever
line of reasoning were used. For instance, there is a great difference between,
on the one hand, regarding respect for a person's refusal of treatment as
being necessary in order to respect the person, and, on the other hand, classi-
fying this as euthanasia and, therefore, regarding withdrawal of treatment in
these circumstances as setting a precedent for euthanasia. While ends or
results can set precedents, often, the stronger precedent-setting force is the
reasoning used to justify and the means used to attain those results. Death
itself cannot set a precedent, because all of us ultimately face death, and if
death itself set a precedent, this could mean that there would be no restric-
tions on the way in which death could be inflicted. The important prece-
dents are how death may and must not be allowed to occur and the reasons
on which these conclusions are based.
Proponents of euthanasia argue for a presumption in favour of allowing
euthanasia on the grounds that it is a rational response. But rationality,
itself, is not a sufficient justification for euthanasia or other conduct. We
also need to consult our moral intuition and even our emotions. While in
some individual cases, for some persons, compassion could make euthanasia
"feel" right, it is proposed that it does not (or, at least, should not) "feel"
right as one of the fundamental principles on which to found our society.
While feelings can sometimes be misleading in terms of determining what is
and is not acceptable conduct (as indeed can rationality as we have some-
times found to our sorrow), we ignore our feelings at our peril. We need to
take into account "examined" emotions, as well as cognitively based analy-
sis, in deciding whether or not euthanasia is acceptable at the societal
level.230 Our feelings can act as important warnings that although, ration-
ally and logically, two situations may seem to be the same, there may be
additional considerations that differentiate them which it is important to
take into account.231
230. M.A. Somerville, "Justice Across the Generations", Social Science & Medicine 1989;
29:385-394.
231. The very recent work of Dr. Mildred Solomon, presented at the American Society of
Law and Medicine conference, supra, note 155, seems to demonstrate this phenomenon. She
reported that she and her colleagues have found that two out of three physicians surveyed feel
that there is a difference between with-holding and withdrawing treatment, and are much more
uncomfortable with the latter, despite the general consensus in bioethics and "medicine, ethics
and law" literature, that these are ethically and legally equivalent. Solomon et al. suggest this
feeling may have a deeper ethical purpose - to keep us from becoming insensitive to the seri-
ousness of withdrawing treatment and making this too easy to do. As she said, it needs to be a
difficult decision and act, in particular, because cases of withdrawal of treatment are often not
ethically clear cut. In contrast, cases in which treatment is not commenced are, in general,
ones in which there is little doubt that non-treatment is justified and, consequently, they do not
raise the same ethical concerns.
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It, also, needs to be considered which basic presumption should govern,
initially, with respect to intervention by the state in decisions regarding
treatment at the end of life. If the decision is a purely private one, the pre-
sumption is that the state should not intervene; however, if the decision has
public aspects, this is not the case. Whether there is an initial presumption
either for or against state intervention in a person's decision regarding treat-
ment at the end of life, does not make a great deal of difference in relation to
competent adults with respect to decisions falling within a range of conduct
that is not considered contrary to "public policy" in common law systems,
or "public order and good morals" in civilian legal systems. This is true,
because whether respecting the person's decision concerning himself or her-
self is regarded as a basic presumption or an exception, and likewise, but
alternatively, the claim of the state to intervene, the person's decision will
govern. However, the choice of presumption is determinative when incom-
petent persons are involved, because the initial presumption cannot be dis-
placed and will govern.
It can be suggested that in the Cruzan case232, for example, the majority
of the United States Supreme Court utilized a basic presumption that the
state has a right to govern decisions concerning medical treatment of a per-
son, unless the person's decisions in this regard fall within certain parame-
ters. Similarly, in the Quinlan case, the court held that "the state's right to
protect life weakens and the right to privacy strengthens as the prognosis
dims".233 In contrast, the dissent in the Cruzan case utilized a presumption
that persons have a right to decide for themselves on medical treatment,
unless their decisions fall outside certain parameters, when the state may
intervene.
We need to investigate these presumptions, because it seems that a pre-
sumption against state intervention in persons' decisions, a presumption
which is desirable in the case of persons' rights to refuse treatment, is also
being utilized to support claims to euthanasia, on the grounds that, likewise,
the state should not interfere in these decisions."3 One relevant distinction
between these two situations concerns the definition of what constitutes
medical treatment. It is proposed that it is incorrect to classify euthanasia as
such. Therefore, a precedent that governs persons' decisions concerning
medical treatment does not necessarily apply to euthanasia. This is not, in
itself, an argument against euthanasia, but it is an argument against legiti-
mizing euthanasia through legitimizing rights to or rights to refuse medical
232. Cruzan v. Harmon, supra, note 201.
233. Re Quinlan, 355 A. 2d 647 (N.J., 1976).
234. See, for example, Notes: Harvard Law Review, supra, note 27.
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treatment, or the latter providing a precedent for legitimizing euthanasia. It
is clear in the public debate that is taking place over euthanasia, that this
route to legitimizing euthanasia through regarding it as medical treatment,
has become a major strategy of persons who are pro-choice on euthanasia.
It is also argued that the state has no legitimate role in relation to deci-
sions concerning euthanasia, because euthanasia is a private decision and, in
a pluralistic society, the state has no moral justification for invading private
decisions. While it is true that one's dying is, in many senses, an intensely
private event, the involvement of third persons, which by definition is the
case in euthanasia, means the decision is not merely a private one. More-
over, if euthanasia were institutionalized, which it would necessarily be by
the passage of law allowing it, it cannot be simply a private decision, it has a
major public aspect.
X. SEEKING INSIGHTS: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BEING ANTI-
EUTHANASIA AND BEING "PRO-LIFE"
There are two senses in which there is a difference between being anti-
euthanasia and being pro-life. The first is that not all or even, possibly, most
persons who are anti-euthanasia would regard themselves as members of the
pro-life movement, nor are their objections to euthanasia religiously based,
as can be true (or at least is often assumed to be true) for members of the
pro-life movement. Moreover, non-pro-life, anti-euthanasia persons, unlike
some pro-life persons, advocate provision of necessary treatment for the re-
lief of pain and other symptoms of serious physical distress, respect for valid
refusals of treatment, and withdrawal of futile or "disproportional" treat-
ment, even when any of these could or will shorten life. The second differ-
ence is that some anti-euthanasia persons in the pro-life movement would
allow capital punishment, that is, they do not oppose all killing of other
humans and in this sense, while they are anti-euthanasia, they are not uni-
formly pro-life.
What could one learn by comparing euthanasia and capital punishment,
sadly, a form of killing legalized in some jurisdictions? There are four possi-
ble positions that persons could take: (i) that they are against capital punish-
ment and against euthanasia; (ii) that they agree with capital punishment,
but are against euthanasia; (iii) that they agree with capital punishment and
euthanasia; or (iv) that they are against capital punishment, but agree with
euthanasia. What underlying philosophy would each of these positions rep-
resent? The first is a true pro-life position, in that, it demonstrates a moral
belief that all killing (except, usually, as a last resort in self-defence) is
wrong. The second position represents the view of some fundamentalists,
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namely, that to uphold the sanctity of life value requires prohibition of eu-
thanasia, but capital punishment is justified on the grounds that this punish-
ment is deserved and just according to God's law. The third position is that
of some conservatives, who see capital punishment as a fit penalty on the
basis that one can forfeit one's life through a very serious crime, but that one
can also consent to the taking of one's own life in the form of euthanasia.
The fourth view is that of some civil libertarians, that one can consent to the
taking of one's own life but cannot take that of others.
Through such analyses, one can see where the various groups agree with
each other and disagree. For example, the true pro-life persons and the fun-
damentalists agree with each other in being against euthanasia, and some
conservatives and civil libertarians agree with each other in arguing for the
availability of euthanasia. On the other hand, the true pro-life and civil lib-
ertarians join in their views in being against capital punishment, whereas the
fundamentalists and some conservatives agree that this is acceptable. In
short, with respect to the issue involved here, the taking of one person's life
by another, various groups can coalesce and agree in certain instances in
which this issue arises, while they may be radically divergent in others. We
need to be aware of these possibilities of a mixture of consensus and diver-
gence as between different groups, in assessing the political realities, public
policy stances and analysis relevant to euthanasia.
XI. SEEKING FURTHER INSIGHTS: ANTI ANTI-EUTHANASIA AND ANTI
"PRO-EUTHANASIA" ARGUMENTS
Although the aim is the same, and there is necessarily overlap between
various arguments in both cases, there can be a difference in the content of
the propositions used when arguing for allowing euthanasia, as compared
with arguing against the anti-euthanasia position. The same is true with re-
spect to arguing against the "pro-euthanasia" position, as compared with
arguing for the anti-euthanasia one.
(A) Arguments Against the Anti-Euthanasia Position
(i) Suffering and mercy
Euthanasia is advocated as being suffering reducing by those in favour of
its being allowed and, therefore, persons who are anti-euthanasia can be per-
ceived as being pro-suffering. No humane person advocates suffering, but
unavoidable suffering is not seen as entirely negative by everyone. Some cul-
tures or religions attribute value to suffering. This is to propose that suffer-
ing is not always the greatest evil, such that actions, including euthanasia,
aimed at relieving suffering are always a lesser evil and are, therefore, accept-
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able. Not ending life is characterized by some pro-choice or euthanasia ad-
vocates as an act of infliction of suffering, rather than being seen as an
example of our inability sometimes to relieve suffering. We need to ask
whether this is, yet, another example of the "do something" syndrome. Not
being able to act to try to improve a very distressing situation makes us
highly anxious, and we do not accept that there are some situations in which
we cannot or ought not to "do something". We assume that "doing some-
thing" is better than "doing nothing" and that "doing something" will im-
prove the situation either in moral or practical (including not infrequently
political) terms.
Physicians may experience and display an especially powerful version of
the "do something" phenomenon. Physicians can be very uncomfortable,
even highly anxious, if they feel unable to intervene to improve a patient's
situation, especially if the patient is seriously ill, as all terminally ill patients
are. One response to such patients can be to more-or-less abandon them - to
visit these patients less often and to spend little time with them. Another
response is "[t]he great temptation of modem medicine, not always resisted,
...to move beyond the promotion and preservation of health into the
boundless realm of general human happiness and well-being".235 While
physicians may do much good in trying to achieve such objectives, not all
ways of doing so are acceptable or do more good than harm. In particular,
"[i]t would be terrible for physicians to think that in a swift, lethal injection,
medicine has found its own answer to the riddle of life. It would be a false
answer; given by the wrong people.",
236
Being anti-euthanasia is also regarded by some persons as a non-merciful
stance. It is difficult to argue against persons who see themselves as merciful
and the persons opposing them as unmerciful. Proponents of euthanasia ar-
gue that it is unethical not to provide euthanasia, because this is unmerciful,
that is, prohibiting euthanasia is not only non-beneficent, but also even ma-
leficent. There is a stronger moral obligation not to do harm than to do
good, although distinguishing whether a given situation should be character-
ized as one or the other can sometimes be difficult. Consequently, to argue
that failure to provide euthanasia is unmerciful and that this is maleficent, is
a stronger argument in favour of euthanasia than simply arguing that to
provide it is to confer a benefit. It is, however, also argued that euthanasia is
compassionate and beneficent, in particular, that it benefits the patient, the
family, health care professionals and society.
235. Callahan, supra, note 179, p.55.
236. Ibid..
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(ii) "Reasonably well or dead"
It is argued as well, that not to allow euthanasia contravenes the aim that
persons be either "reasonably well or dead". It is true that, largely as a
result of modern medical technology, we can now be very sick and live for a
considerable time and that the "wellness curve", rather than gradually de-
clining over a period of time, can be "squared" by euthanasia. In other
words, euthanasia allows one to go directly from being reasonably well to
dead. It is possible, however, also to "square" the morbidity curve by good
palliative care and pain relief treatment, rather than euthanasia; that is, well-
ness or at least a sense of well-being, is not necessarily dependent upon the
absence of disease.237 Stated another way, in the vast majority of cases eu-
thanasia should be unnecessary in the sense of being the only option for
avoiding serious suffering, if good palliative care, including adequate pain
relief treatment, is provided.
(iii) Liberty
It is also argued that euthanasia should be available to those who want to
die, as a matter of respect for personal liberty and, therefore, that those who
oppose euthanasia fail to respect important liberty rights. We need to be
careful, however, with equating "wanting to die", in the sense that a person
feels that he or she is ready for and even would welcome death, and "want-
ing to be killed". Many, and probably most, people at the end of their lives
are "ready to die", but this does not mean that they "want to be killed".
Further, as noted already, the availability of euthanasia is not one-sided in
its impact on liberty. While it can be regarded as extending persons' range
of choice concerning how and when they die, its availability can also act as a
pressure to request or agree to euthanasia, which is to restrict persons' lib-
erty.3' There is also a more subtle way in which the availability of euthana-
sia could interfere with liberty. At a recent conference, Denise Ross from
the Dana Farber Cancer Institute, described a conversation she had with a
young terminally ill patient about pain management. He raised the issues of
assisted suicide and euthanasia. She discussed these with him, but told him
she felt obliged to inform him that she would not assist him in these ways.
He replied: "Of course not. I wouldn't feel comfortable talking to you
about this, if you would.",239 It is possible that we need to have a trusted and
237. Moreover, in one sense, with rapidly emerging, highly sophisticated, medical diagnos-
tic techniques, the well among us, are only the undiagnosed sick. I am indebted to Dr. Ken
Flegel, M.D., MRCP(C), of the Royal Victoria Hospital, Montreal, for this insight.
238. See, Brock, supra, note 25, pp.17-18, referring to Velleman.
239. "Conflicts in Managing Intractable Pain and Suffering", American Society of Law
and Medicine conference, supra, note 155.
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trustworthy institutional forum in which to explore such matters, without
fear of being subjected to the kinds of intervention that we discuss. The
forum used to be organized religion, but for many persons now, medicine
has replaced this. A liberty interest would be breached by not retaining such
a forum. This is one argument why, even, if euthanasia were to be legalized,
it should not become part of medical practice.
(B) Arguments Against the "Pro-Euthanasia" Position
(i) Precedent
It is accepted that, at an individual or micro level, persons of "good con-
science" can believe that euthanasia is morally acceptable in certain circum-
stances, in particular, circumstances of intense, unrelievable suffering. It is
argued, however, that even if one accepts this, euthanasia is unacceptable,
because of the precedent that allowing it would set at the societal level. In
this respect, can it be argued that it is even more important in a secularized
world, than in a religiously based one, not to allow euthanasia, because our
worldly acts are the only sources of our values? Further, what would hap-
pen in a secularized world with a shortage of health care resources, if we
allowed euthanasia? Would persons be graded on a scale of "useless" to
"highly useful" and resources allocated or, alternatively, euthanasia pro-
vided according to the relative degrees of perceived utility of the persons
concerned? Would this give rise to a euthanasia line or continuum ranging
from unethical or less ethically acceptable acts of euthanasia to more ethi-
cally acceptable ones? This ethical continuum can be compared with the
law's "digital" approach to dealing with such a range of conduct. Unless all
acts of euthanasia would be allowed, the law would require that a line be
drawn across the range of acts dividing them into two groups. One group of
these acts would be legally acceptable and the other group legally unaccept-
able, although the acts that make up each group would not be equally ac-
ceptable or unacceptable, respectively, from other perspectives, including
most importantly, from an ethical perspective. Where would the law draw a
line on the euthanasia continuum? Would some instances of euthanasia that
most persons would regard as doubtfully ethical, or even unethical, be char-
acterized as legal?
(ii) Other arguments
Further arguments against the pro-euthanasia position that have been ex-
plored by others, in particular, Singer and Siegler 2", Wolf,24 Callahan,242
240. Supra, note 127.
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and Capron,2 43 will be simply summarized here. They include perversion of
the proper aims of medicine, if physicians are the persons who carry out
euthanasia. This would be to turn medicine from an aim of healing and
caring to one of eliminating the person who needs care. Euthanasia will
extend into all physician-patient interactions, not just those directly involv-
ing euthanasia. 2" In particular, euthanasia can desensitize and brutalize
those who carry it out. This is a particularly disturbing possibility, when
those same persons are our healers and caregivers - physicians and other
health care professionals. Moreover, the major separation of the two roles of
the witch doctor (the modern, physician's ancient predecessor), that of healer
and death inflictor, the most influential and important articulation of which
is to be found in the two-thousand-year-old Hippocratic Oath, would be re-
versed. As Kass, so powerfully, states "the deepest ethical principle re-
straining the physician's power is not the autonomy or freedom of the
patient; neither is it his own compassion or good intention. Rather it is the
dignity and mysterious power of life, itself". 245 Euthanasia puts the "very
soul of medicine" on trial.
2 4 6
As has been discussed at various points throughout this text, the symbol-
ism of euthanasia is unacceptable, even if it is carried out for the most hu-
mane reasons, as it constitutes the most serious derogation from the sanctity
of life value. It has been well said, that sanctity of life has been unduly
identified with and confined to the religious commandment. There are also
secular reasons - moral, rational and medical - for respecting sanctity of life
and rejecting euthanasia and these need to be explored.247
To allow euthanasia would inflict suffering and have potentially dangerous
effects on certain already vulnerable groups, for example, handicapped per-
sons or chronically ill persons. The same grounds on which euthanasia is
carried out on others are often true of these persons and, even if they are not
at risk of being subject to euthanasia, the fact that others in a similar posi-
tion are subject to it, devalues their lives.
24 8
241. S. Wolf, "Holding the Line on Euthanasia", Hastings Center Report 1989; 19(l)(Spec.
Supp.):13-15.
242. Supra, note 202.
243. Capron, supra, note 11, p.3 2 .
244. Ibid., p.32.
245. Kass as quoted in Brock, supra, note 25, p. 17 .
246. Ibid., p.16, quoting W. Gaylin et al..
247. Fenigsen, supra, note 50, p.2 4 .
248. It has also been noted (see, for example, A. Trafford, "Wishing to die: are women
really more open to assisted suicide?", Washington Post, reprinted in The Gazette, Montreal,
Monday, March 15, 1993, p.D5) that all of the recent, highly publicized cases of physician
assisted suicide in North America have involved the death of women - historically a vulnerable
group.
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There is also it is proposed a greater danger of abuse if euthanasia were
legalized than if it is not. Even if this cannot be established, those advocat-
ing euthanasia should at least have the burden of proving the contrary. Pos-
sible abuses include that euthanasia could be involuntary, that is, carried out
without consent or against the wishes of the person; or carried out secretly
despite its being, indeed, because it is, legalized; or persons would be en-
couraged to seek euthanasia; or it could be so-called "surrogate euthanasia",
that is, a person other than the one being euthanased, authorizes euthanasia;
or euthanasia could be applied in a discriminatory manner in terms of the
persons who are subject to it.249 As Singer and Siegler state, these risks are
especially serious in an era of "cost containment, social injustice and ethical
relativism".250
The availability of euthanasia may also detract from developing better
care for dying persons, as the quick and easy answer is to use euthanasia,
rather than to carry out research in order to develop and improve such care.
Indeed, it can be asked whether, if euthanasia had been available, we would
have developed the often sophisticated palliative care techniques that we
have today.251 It would be interesting to examine the situation in The
Netherlands in this respect, to determine the availability of palliative care
resources and hospices and to see whether or not the euthanasia response
was, or is, related to the unavailability of or inaccessibility to such care. The
availability of euthanasia could also create pressure to accept or to request it
to relieve burdens on one's family and society.
Euthanasia would also be likely to interfere with current legal approaches
to refusal of treatment. As Wolf2 52 points out, the courts would be reluctant
to stay out of decisions at the end of life, if euthanasia were one option.
Moreover, we might not have developed mechanisms such as "advance di-
rectives", if euthanasia had been an option.
Most contentiously, perhaps, one can argue that euthanasia interferes with
the final stage of our human development - dealing with death. Euthanasia
is a short-term, simple, easy in some senses, appealing to some, solution. But
we need long-term perspectives on euthanasia, which may be more complex
and difficult in many respects. Through these, we are more likely to work
out the mystery and complexity of our dying and with this our living, be-
cause the latter is necessarily related to the former.
Finally, euthanasia would set a precedent of universal application, be-
249. Singer and Siegler, supra note 127, p.18 82 .
250. Ibid., p. 1 8 3 3 .
251. Wolf, supra, note 241.
252. Ibid..
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cause, at some point, each of us must face death. This universality can be
regarded as beneficial from the point of view that there will be strong per-
sonal identification with the possibility that, if euthanasia were legalized, it
could be applied to us, which should make people think very seriously about
whether or not they agree with the precedent that legalizing euthanasia
would set. At some stage, each of us would be the person on the other side
of "the veil of ignorance" to whom the euthanasia decision could apply - the
veil behind which Rawls suggests we should make difficult decisions, on the
basis that we do not know, at the time of the decision, which actor we will be
when the decision is implemented.2 3 The universality of the application of
a euthanasia precedent is also immensely frightening in the potential extent
of its use.
There are some fine lines which we should never cross and, it is proposed,
one of these is that separating euthanasia, as defined, from other interven-
tions or non-interventions at the end of life.
CONCLUSION
We are not only logical, rational beings, we are also emotional, intuitive,
spiritual (which is not the same as religious) ones. Our "ways of knowing"
are complex, diverse and vast.
Much of the argument for euthanasia is logical and rational (for example,
that there is no difference between actively killing and allowing to die), but it
can also be emotional (for instance, that we have obligations to be merciful
and to relieve suffering). The arguments against euthanasia are also logical
(for example, the "slippery slope" argument) and emotional (for instance,
the sanctity of human life). For some persons, the arguments are also reli-
gious or possibly just spiritual.
Euthanasia (as defined) should be seen as different in kind not just degree
from other acts or omissions that could or do shorten life. It is argued that
one crosses a great divide in undertaking intentional killing; that while pain
and other symptoms of serious physical distress should be relieved, it must
always be the pain or other symptoms that one seeks to eliminate and not the
person with the pain or symptoms. Moreover, even if euthanasia were to be
justified in an individual case, the societal level effect that legitimizing this
would set, especially legitimation through authorizing legislation, is
unacceptable.
When we disagree, it is important to delve below the level of our disagree-
ment and to try to find a deeper consensus. To start from consensus and
253. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1971), pp.1 2 , 137 et seq.
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move to disagreement, has a different effect than starting from disagreement.
The two poles of the euthanasia argument are clear: pro-choice on euthana-
sia - no interventions, including infliction of death, aimed at reducing or
eliminating suffering should be prohibited; pro-life - all interventions that
could or would shorten life should be prohibited. It is much more difficult to
belong to the middle of this debate and to draw a line somewhere in the grey
(or purple-pink254) zone between the poles, and to argue that some actions
that shorten or fail to prolong life are prohibited and others, even those with
the same outcome as a prohibited action, are allowed. Where we should
agree is that none of us is pro-suffering and none of us is anti-death when "its
time has come". Where we disagree is the means that may be used to reduce
suffering or to cause or to allow death to occur.
The euthanasia debate is an immensely important one, which is likely,
more than any other current issue, to set the legal and ethical tones of our
societies as they become societies of the 21st century. We will learn and
need to learn much along the way, because this is a complex debate, with
micro and macro impact; unconscious origins; conscious realizations and in-
sights; major effects on symbolic and value factors; and links to many other
societal issues outside the context of euthanasia, including balancing rights
or claims of individuals which conflict with rights or claims of the commu-
nity. Is prohibition of euthanasia an example of sacrificing the individual
who desires euthanasia, for the good of the community which would be
harmed by the precedent set in allowing euthanasia? Is euthanasia the final
act of love of caring individuals and a caring society? Or is euthanasia an
isolation ritual whereby the individual is expelled from the collective, the
members of which bond to each other through shared guilt?2"' To decide
such questions will take wisdom, compassion, courage and hope - the antith-
esis of despair, which so often is, but need not be present in situations involv-
ing euthanasia. How we deal with euthanasia is likely to be one of the most
important mirrors of ourselves, our society and our relationships - both as
intimates and strangers. We need, therefore, to take great care in fashioning
the lyrics of the songs that we sing about it, because these lyrics will play a
crucial role in determining the reality regarding euthanasia, that gives rise to
these reflections. Moreover, our decisions and actions in relation to euthana-
sia will create not only immediate reflections, but also themes and echoes of
enormous importance for those who come after us to live in the world of the
future.
254. See, Somerville, supra, note 43.
255. D. Schulman, "Remembering Who We Are: AIDS and Law in a Time of Madness",
(1988) 3 AIDS and Public Policy, 75-76.
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ADDENDUM
"The Song of Death: The Lyrics of Euthanasia"
Doctor Margaret Somerville
The term futile is used to include both medically useless treatment and
that in which benefits, if any, of the treatment are minimal and are clearly
outweighed by its harms. It is recognized that such determinations unavoid-
ably involve value judgments, which is often so source of criticism of ap-
proaches depending on these. The solution is not to avoid such approaches
when these are otherwise the best ones (as it is proposed is truth with, re-
spect to determinations regarding when treatment is futile), but to surround
them with sufficient safeguards. See also, infra pp.61-62.
